1. Corporate Intent Exposed

At the center of a new class action lawsuit is an allegation that Bank of America, N.A. (“Defendant”) engineered what the complaint calls a “bait-and-switch” credit card rewards offer. This case arises from a single man’s experience—yet the legal complaint and related consumer-protection discussions suggest this matter could be far more expansive, possibly affecting many other consumers who sought similar rewards and found themselves shortchanged.

The Essential Allegations

According to the legal documents, filed on January 17, 2025, by Plaintiff Jean-Baptiste Boyer-Gomez, the story begins in April 2024. That month, Boyer-Gomez saw and relied on an advertisement for a new Air France KLM World Elite Mastercard. The advertised promotion sounded highly appealing, especially for a traveler or someone eager to accumulate travel-related points: Earn 70,000 Bonus Miles plus 40 XP (Experience Points) after you make $3,000 or more in purchases within the first 90 days of your account opening. Plus, get 60 XP upon approval!

These credit card promotions can represent a windfall for consumers, particularly frequent travelers who collect miles and points. In the complaint, the Plaintiff states that his decision to apply for the credit card was heavily influenced by that advertised bonus. After applying, he was sent an email reiterating these same terms. When the card arrived, he began using it, convinced that spending the required $3,000 in 90 days would guarantee him 70,000 bonus miles plus 100 total XP (40 XP after qualification plus 60 XP upon approval). In short, the potential for travel upgrades, free flights, or other travel perks beckoned.

But, as alleged, the story took a turn. After losing his card and requesting a replacement, the Plaintiff received a second set of materials. One of these documents appeared to confirm the original offer. However, buried alongside it was a different advertisement referencing a separate, less generous offer: 50,000 bonus miles and 60 XP if the customer spent $2,000 in the first 90 days. In his complaint, the Plaintiff asserts that the bank effectively “switched” him to that lesser bonus, ultimately costing him a significant difference in rewards.

The legal document points to moments in subsequent phone conversations that allegedly confirm this was not an isolated issue. A Bank of America representative is said to have indicated that “numerous other individuals” had lodged complaints about the bank’s failure to honor the original promotions. Despite receiving repeated requests for redress, the complaint says, Bank of America refused to budge. They maintained that the second offer was valid and binding, and that no error had occurred. The gist of the lawsuit, then, is that consumers were apparently lured in with big promises, only to discover—after devoting significant time and money to meeting the spending requirement—that the fine print or subsequent “switch” left them with fewer miles or points than initially touted.

Why It Matters

On its face, one could see this as simply a “contract dispute.” The Plaintiff, after all, says he had a valid contract for a certain set of rewards. But a deeper look (and the complaint encourages this viewpoint) reveals potential systemic issues that resonate beyond a single consumer’s predicament. Within the broader economic framework often labeled “neoliberal capitalism,” deregulation and weakened consumer-protection standards can, according to many consumer advocates, incentivize precisely these sorts of profit-driven corporate strategies.

Here, the key questions revolve around corporate ethics and corporate accountability: How do major financial institutions, especially those that have been subject to regulatory scrutiny before, still end up facing new allegations of deceptive practices? The legal complaint references prior enforcement actions by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), including one that called out Bank of America’s “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices related to rewards.” This underscores how repeated patterns can survive in the system, particularly if the corporate culture and the profit motive align in a way that enables ongoing questionable conduct.

In the complaint, the Plaintiff references a May 2024 CFPB report about “consumer frustrations with Credit Card Rewards Programs.” According to that report, thousands of consumers lodged formal grievances. A top complaint was that financial institutions made sign-up bonus offers that either came with hidden conditions or were never delivered, turning it into what is effectively a classic “bait-and-switch.” Allegations such as these form the backdrop of Boyer-Gomez’s lawsuit, suggesting that this behavior is neither novel nor isolated.

The Human Angle

Reading through the complaint, one senses the frustration and betrayal that come with discovering that your anticipated reward is not what you were originally promised. The complaint describes how the Plaintiff spent nearly $7,000 on the card—well above the $3,000 threshold. Only after he had diligently used the card did he realize that Bank of America intended to honor a different, cheaper offer. The difference, in purely monetary terms, might be around $200 or more, depending on how one values frequent flyer miles and XP. Yet as the complaint frames it, the real issue is trust. This is not just about some “fine print”; it speaks to the loss of confidence a consumer experiences when a bank or any financial institution changes the rules mid-game.

These alleged losses are far from negligible, but from a corporate perspective, the incremental margin on each consumer might look small—perhaps minuscule in the grand scheme of a multinational bank’s bottom line. Yet repeated over thousands (or more) of customers nationwide, the potential windfall for the bank can be substantial, with minimal risk unless regulators or private lawsuits intervene.

Echoes of Corporate Strategy

Historically (and this part is general context), some large corporations in the financial sector have faced similar allegations:

• Ambiguous Terms: Complex credit card deals sometimes contain disclaimers or separate mailers with alternate terms, which can confuse the consumer about which set of terms applies.
• Shifting the Goalposts: After a consumer has applied or started using the product, the bank may claim a “different” offer was always in place, or that the originally advertised bonus was never intended for certain applicants.
• Profiting From Breakage: In rewards programs, there is often a concept of “breakage,” or the unredeemed or partially redeemed rewards. By complicating or restricting the path to the original bonus, a bank can reduce redemption and thus reduce its costs, all while continuing to benefit from card use, late fees, and interest charges.

Within the complaint’s storyline, the guy repeatedly asked Bank of America to produce a copy of the original agreement. But the bank repeatedly refused. This refusal to disclose relevant documents, if true, might be read as a tactic to limit the consumer’s ability to prove that the original contract guaranteed a higher-mileage bonus. To the extent that a bank can rely on opaque or shifting contract terms, it can tilt the playing field in its favor.

Corporate Intent

The legal complaint’s main refrain—bait-and-switch—evokes an image of a purposeful corporate intent to lure in potential customers with one appealing set of terms, only to quietly implement a less generous arrangement once the consumer is locked in. In a broader neoliberal capitalism framework (again, this is broader context and not from the complaint itself), deregulation can open the door for creative or manipulative marketing. Regulatory capture—where agencies are underfunded or outmaneuvered—can also reduce oversight. It is within such an environment that large corporations, driven by the imperative of profit-maximization and shareholder returns, might consider the risk of lawsuits or small fines a tolerable cost of doing business.

From the vantage point of corporate social responsibility, this raises questions about the ethics of these marketing campaigns. The complaint underscores that Bank of America has faced prior CFPB scrutiny, which indicates that warnings and enforcement actions alone may not necessarily end questionable business practices if the underlying profit incentives remain unaltered. Critics of wealth disparity and corporate greed might argue that these patterns are part of an overarching environment where corporate polluters, corporations’ dangers to public health, and other unethical behaviors become normalized if not consistently punished.

Conclusion of This Section

At its core, this complaint, Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A., surfaces alleged corporate misconduct in the form of a “bait-and-switch” credit card offer. Whether these allegations prove to be accurate, the complaint offers a lens into how major banking institutions and credit card companies can engineer marketing campaigns that promise enticing rewards but deliver something altogether different. If proven, this conduct not only violates consumer trust, it might highlight a deeper systemic flaw: a business culture that subordinates consumer interests to shareholder profit, guarded by opaque language and marketing. In the sections that follow, we will consider the mechanics of how this “playbook” typically unfolds, why it can be so profitable, why regulators sometimes fail to intervene effectively, and what the public can do about it.

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2. The Corporate Playbook / How They Got Away with It

In the second section of this investigation, we turn our gaze from the specific allegations in the complaint to the broader question: How do corporations, particularly in the financial sector, manage to execute a “bait-and-switch” on their customers—and for so long, seemingly undetected or unimpeded by regulation? This is where the phrase “corporate playbook” enters the conversation. It refers to a set of strategies that can be gleaned from the complaint and from broader historical patterns in the financial industry.

Alleged Tactics in This Case

The complaint details a set of steps that paint a picture of how, from the Plaintiff’s perspective, Bank of America orchestrated an outcome where the consumer was locked into a less generous credit card bonus structure:

1. Enticing Marketing
   The complaint highlights a promotional advertisement that offered a distinctly higher reward—70,000 bonus miles plus 40 XP (in addition to 60 XP upon approval)—than a separate fallback offer. This message was repeated across multiple channels, including direct email and the front page of the credit card application. It was the promise of this superior reward that induced the Plaintiff, according to the complaint, to apply for the card.
2. Repetition of the Same Terms
   Even upon receiving the new card, the Plaintiff says he saw a document referencing that same 70,000 bonus miles plus 40 XP. This reinforcement helped ensure that the Plaintiff continued to believe the original terms were valid.
3. Embedded Alternate Offer
   A second advertisement arrived with the replacement card after the Plaintiff lost his original. This advertisement had a significantly lower bonus (50,000 miles plus 60 XP). Because the two sets of documents were, as alleged, somewhat conflated, the Plaintiff claims not to have realized that Bank of America would unilaterally impose the less generous set of rewards.
4. Post-Spend Discovery
   The complaint says the Plaintiff discovered only after he spent over $6,900 on the card in the 90-day window that he had not been granted the higher bonus. By then, it was too late. His spending had already occurred, presumably also generating interchange fees and possibly interest payments for Bank of America.
5. Denial and Deflection
   Despite phone calls, letters, and a formal 93A demand letter under Massachusetts law, the bank refused to adjust his bonus or provide restitution. The complaint notes that a phone agent admitted to receiving “numerous complaints” about similar issues. Yet in a subsequent letter, the bank insisted no error had been made.

In short, it is alleged that the bank crafted a marketing funnel that captured the consumer’s trust and locked him into a less favorable contract. While the complaint focuses on one instance, the class action posture suggests that this “bait-and-switch” might have happened to many others.

Common Industry Patterns (General Background)

Outside of this specific lawsuit, there is a well-documented pattern of what consumer advocates call “gotcha marketing” in finance. To reiterate, these observations are general context, not drawn directly from the complaint:

• Fine-Print Footnotes: Corporations sometimes bury disclaimers in small print or behind multiple hyperlinks. When a consumer fails to catch a small detail in the avalanche of disclaimers, the company can pivot and say, “But it was always disclosed.”
• Replacement Documents: Mailing or emailing new terms with replacement cards or re-issued statements. The timing often leads consumers to assume the old contract remains in effect, when in fact the corporation is citing new disclaimers.
• Customer Service Runaround: Telephone representatives often lack authority to rectify problems, or are trained to provide “boilerplate” refusals. This discourages a subset of consumers from continuing to pursue the issue. Over time, many frustrated cardholders may simply give up, accepting the lesser bonus.
• Limited Regulatory Oversight: Government agencies may be stretched thin; with thousands of complaints, each single “bait-and-switch” can look individually small. That can reduce the sense of urgency or capacity for thorough investigations.

In the Boyer-Gomez complaint, we see reflections of some of these typical tactics: the acceptance of new terms buried with a replacement card, the alleged phone center admission that “numerous other individuals” complained, yet a refusal to fix the issue. According to the complaint, the bank did not produce a copy of the original agreement even when the Plaintiff demanded it—further complicating efforts to prove that the original marketing was indeed a binding contract.

The Role of Timing and Confusion

One overlooked aspect is how time can be an ally in the corporate playbook. The Plaintiff in this suit did not discover the reduced rewards until after he had already hit (and exceeded) the required spending threshold. If the corporation’s alleged strategy is to swap in a new or different offer, that means the consumer only learns about the inferior terms once the purchase window has effectively closed. At that point, the consumer is left with far fewer immediate remedies: The card has been used, the budget allocated, other credit cards not used in the interim. It is effectively too late to pivot to a competitor’s card. This phenomenon parallels cases in other industries where a contract change is noticed by the consumer only after the consumer has invested resources—be it time, money, or both.

Such timing-based confusion can be intentional or result from corporate inertia. Either way, as the complaint suggests, it worked to Bank of America’s benefit. If a card user has no real recourse to recoup lost points or miles, the corporation can maintain the position that everything was handled properly, while leveraging the consumer’s frustration to encourage them simply to move on.

The Significance of ‘Numerous Complaints’

In the legal complaint, one of the more revealing allegations is that a phone representative purportedly admitted that this was not an isolated incident. Rather, “numerous other individuals” had complained about the exact same “bait-and-switch.” If proven, that raises the question of whether the bank was aware of a systematic glitch or marketing mismatch. In many class action lawsuits, plaintiffs must show there was a consistent practice or policy, not just an accidental or random error. The complaint suggests that repeated consumer calls should have put the bank on notice. Its refusal to make internal changes or rectify the matter for the complaining customers indicates that a certain pattern or standard operating procedure might have been in place.

Under typical consumer protection standards, once a company knows (or should know) that marketing materials are misleading or that certain disclaimers are unclear, it has a duty to correct the problem. If, instead, it continues to advertise the same terms without clarifying disclaimers, it might be exposed to claims of willful or intentional conduct. In Massachusetts, specifically, the complaint invokes M.G.L. c. 93A, an influential state consumer-protection statute that can impose treble damages if the conduct is found to be “knowing or willful.”

Tactics That Might ‘Fly Under the Radar’

One might wonder: Why would a bank risk this? The complaint outlines a scenario that, on paper, looks blatantly unfair to the consumer. But from a corporate standpoint—particularly in the context of wealth disparity and profit maximization under neoliberal capitalism—there are reasons why such tactics might still be employed:

1. Profit Imperative: A business that stands to earn fees, interest, or interchange revenue from each credit card account may find it profitable to attract as many new customers as possible. The biggest sign-up bonuses are the best lure.
2. Low Likelihood of High-Profile Enforcement: Unless a regulatory body invests significant resources, enforcement actions can be sporadic. The costs of a future settlement or a potential fine can be far less than the revenue generated by questionable marketing across thousands of accounts.
3. Consumer Fatigue: A fraction of consumers may never notice the discrepancy or, if they notice, may fail to contest it due to the complexity involved or the small dollar value relative to the hassle.
4. Settlement vs. Trial: Even if a class action lawsuit emerges, large corporations sometimes settle for an amount that still allows them to come out ahead if the questionable practice lasted long enough and impacted enough customers.

Thus, from the vantage point of corporate accountability, these tactics might exemplify how “crime pays,” at least until an entity like the CFPB or a series of high-profile lawsuits forces changes. Given that the complaint references prior CFPB actions against Bank of America, the question remains whether such enforcement was comprehensive enough or if the bank found ways around earlier compliance mandates.

Final Thoughts on the “Corporate Playbook” in This Complaint

The legal complaint Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A. shows us the potential synergy of well-honed marketing strategies, complex disclaimers, and minimal corporate responsiveness that can allow a “bait-and-switch” to flourish. All the while, the most loyal or trusting cardholders—those excited about the brand’s sign-up bonus—may be the ones left most disappointed.

In the next sections, we will explore how the alleged financial benefits of these practices might dwarf any concerns about reputational harm, why regulators sometimes fall short in preventing such incidents, and how these situations reflect larger systemic features of modern corporate conduct. We’ll also examine the role of the PR machine in mitigating public outrage when these tactics eventually surface.

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3. Crime Pays / The Corporate Profit Equation

A question permeates the legal allegations in Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A.: Why would a major financial institution risk its reputation and regulatory sanctions just to shave off a fraction of a consumer’s promised rewards? The complaint itself does not delve deeply into the bank’s internal profit calculations, but one can infer that major financial institutions weigh the gains from such marketing schemes against the costs of potential regulatory fines or lawsuit settlements. If the ratio tips in favor of the bank’s bottom line, a pattern emerges where “crime pays”—a phrase frequently used by critics of corporate corruption, corporate greed, and the darker side of corporate capitalism.

Breakage and the Rewards Sweet Spot

In credit card rewards programs, a term commonly referenced (outside the complaint, but known within the industry) is “breakage.” Breakage is what happens when consumers fail to fully redeem the rewards they are entitled to. But breakage can also occur when a corporation sets terms so that only a portion of eligible customers actually complete the necessary steps in time—or, in a more insidious variation, when a corporation unilaterally changes or denies a portion of the rewards.

• Minimizing Payout: If the bank originally promised 70,000 points + 100 XP, it might bear a higher cost to fund or purchase those miles from the airline or issuer. By “switching” a consumer to a lower tier (50,000 miles + 60 XP), the bank cuts the cost of acquiring or fulfilling those extra points. Multiplied across thousands of accounts, these savings could be significant.
• Maximizing Consumer Spending: The complaint mentions that the Plaintiff spent nearly $7,000 in that initial 90-day window. This spending presumably generated interchange fees for the bank, plus potential interest if the balance was carried. A big promotional offer can spur customers to spend more quickly to hit thresholds, which benefits the bank in the short run.
• Interest and Fees: If any portion of that spending is not paid in full, the bank collects interest. The more the card is used, the greater the chance the consumer might slip up on a payment, leading to late fees and penalty interest rates. These fees are often quite profitable.

In sum, from a purely financial standpoint, the marketing tactic alleged here—promising a high-value reward—brings in more revenue. Subsequently failing to deliver the full reward reduces expenses. The net effect, if unchallenged, can be a revenue windfall.

The Regulatory Fine as a Cost of Doing Business

Though the complaint references prior regulatory actions by the CFPB—particularly focusing on credit card rewards issues—it is worth noting that many large financial institutions factor these potential penalties into their overall business model. From a purely capitalist perspective, this is a variant of the “cost of doing business” phenomenon: if the revenue from a questionable practice exceeds the likely cost of litigation and fines, a company might decide to continue or even expand that practice.

In the context of neoliberal capitalism, critics argue that deregulation and regulatory capture make it easier for corporations to engage in borderline behavior with minimal oversight. Consumer protection agencies may be under-resourced, so the number of enforcement staff is dwarfed by the scale of the bank’s operations. The complaint itself cites a CFPB report detailing over a thousand consumer complaints about credit card rewards in a single year. Yet one might ask: how many of those complaints lead to meaningful enforcement that forces restitution or fundamental changes in policy?

Mass Action or Collective Settlement

The complaint was filed as a class action, signifying that the Plaintiff believes there could be a wide swath of similarly situated consumers. If a court certifies the class, the financial stakes for the bank may rise. Nonetheless, large corporations often find ways to settle class actions for an amount that is still less than what they gained from the alleged misconduct. Even if they pay a multi-million-dollar settlement, that figure might pale compared to the revenue captured from thousands of unwitting customers over many months or years.

In such an environment, allegations of corporate corruption or corporate greed typically intensify. The logic goes: if a bank can acquire extra profits from each consumer, even if just a few hundred dollars, and replicate that across the national customer base, the accumulated gains can be enormous. A final settlement or fine—spread out or discounted in negotiations—could leave the bank with net positive income from the questionable tactic. This is one reason critics question whether the threat of consumer litigation or regulatory fines is truly an effective deterrent.

Damage to Reputational Capital

A corporate brand is not immune to reputational harm. Repeated allegations of “bait-and-switch” or unethical conduct can erode consumer confidence. In some cases, such as high-profile consumer data breaches, the outcry forces major changes or results in massive settlements. However, financial institutions, especially those as large as Bank of America, generally have robust PR and marketing budgets. They invest in public-facing campaigns that highlight philanthropic endeavors, corporate social responsibility, or other reputational pillars. These efforts can overshadow negative stories that might only resonate among a smaller group of customers who read the fine print of class actions.

Moreover, brand loyalty in banking can be surprisingly sticky. Changing banks or credit cards can be time-consuming, involving new direct deposit forms, changes to bill payments, and reconfigured budgeting. Many consumers simply stay put—especially if they believe “all banks are the same” or that the process of switching is more trouble than the rewards. This inertia can blunt the effect of negative publicity.

The Broader Costs to Society

When “crime pays,” as critics phrase it, the total cost is not only borne by individual consumers like the Plaintiff in this case. Several larger societal harms ensue, according to broader consumer advocacy perspectives:

1. Erosion of Trust: Each time a consumer experiences a bait-and-switch, trust in financial institutions is diminished. This distrust can have a chilling effect on people’s willingness to engage in beneficial financial products.
2. Wealth Disparity: Some believe that hidden fees, withheld rewards, and manipulative marketing disproportionately affect lower-income individuals who are less equipped to navigate disputes or hire attorneys. Over time, corporate misconduct can widen existing wealth disparities.
3. Economic Fallout: A well-functioning financial sector is supposed to efficiently channel resources. Deceptive marketing introduces distortions and inefficiencies, as consumers’ money flows to questionable promotions rather than transparent, high-value offerings.
4. Public Health and Well-Being: Although not as direct as corporations’ dangers to public health from pollution or defective products, financial stress can manifest in real health impacts—leading to stress-related illness, reduced productivity, and other negative outcomes.

Again, while the complaint here is specifically about credit card bonuses, many consumer advocates see parallels between these allegations and broader claims of corporate ethics violations in other contexts. When corporations in various industries find that pushing or crossing ethical boundaries yields profit, it can perpetuate a cycle of corner-cutting and wrongdoing.

How (Alleged) Rule-Breaking Becomes Systemic

The ultimate critique is that these are not isolated incidents. The complaint mentions that the CFPB has pursued Bank of America for other credit card rewards issues in the past. This suggests a pattern or repeated practice. In a broader context, banks historically have faced claims over overdraft fees, unauthorized account openings, or predatory lending. The repeated emergence of new claims might signal that internal compliance programs have not effectively curtailed these behaviors—or that there’s a systematic cost-benefit analysis that makes these behaviors profitable enough to persist.

When a corporation finds that certain borderline or deceptive practices can survive regulatory scrutiny by paying occasional fines, there is a strong incentive to keep using them. If the bank publicly denies wrongdoing or positions the matter as a misunderstanding, only a fraction of consumers may dig deeply enough to realize they’re missing out. The net result? A system that encourages questionable marketing because it contributes to short-term gains while incurring relatively minimal long-term costs.

Takeaways for Consumers

From the vantage point of consumer advocacy, the lesson might be: whenever you see a rewards offer, double-check the terms. Screenshot them. Keep all promotional materials. If the company tries to enforce a new or different set of conditions, you at least have some proof. In the Boyer-Gomez complaint, the Plaintiff claims to have done exactly that—he cites repeated confirmations of the original bonus, plus an email from the bank reiterating the same. Yet even that thorough documentation did not dissuade the bank, which the complaint says “refused to provide the contracted-for rewards and refused to supply the original application.” This highlights just how stubborn or entrenched these alleged tactics can be.

In sum, “crime pays” is a shorthand way of describing how the math works out for some corporate strategies under neoliberal capitalism’s drive for profit. The complaint suggests that the difference in promised vs. received rewards amounts to $200 or more for the Plaintiff. For a single household, $200 might be frustrating but not life-altering. For a major bank, scaling that difference across countless accounts could mean millions of dollars. Multiply that potential revenue stream by minimal enforcement risk, and it becomes clear why the complaint casts this behavior in the broader context of corporate accountability, corporate greed, and the profit imperative.

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4. System Failure / Why Regulators Did Nothing

One of the most pressing questions arising from the legal complaint is: Where were the regulators, and why did they not intervene in time to stop this alleged bait-and-switch from happening? The Plaintiff references a May 2024 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) report detailing widespread consumer frustration with credit card rewards. That same report, the complaint notes, highlights that the CFPB received over 1,200 complaints about credit card rewards in 2023 alone, many regarding “bait-and-switch” promotional offers.

Yet despite the CFPB’s awareness of the problem—and a previous action specifically taken against Bank of America for “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices related to rewards”—the complaint asserts that the same or similar tactics have resurfaced. This discrepancy invites an exploration of how neoliberal capitalism, deregulation, and regulatory capture might combine to create a perfect storm of underenforced consumer protection.

Understaffing and Underfunding

In general background commentary, many consumer watchdogs and policy analysts point to systemic underfunding of regulatory bodies. The CFPB, for instance, has faced political pressures and attempts to reduce its budget or limit its enforcement powers since its inception. Limited resources restrict the number of investigations that can be launched and hamper the agency’s ability to pursue each complaint in depth.

In the credit card industry alone, thousands upon thousands of different offers exist. Tracking each advertisement’s disclaimers, verifying that all promotional materials match the contract, and investigating each complaint is labor-intensive. If an institution as large as Bank of America runs multiple marketing channels—print ads, email campaigns, online ads, in-branch promotions—verifying that each is consistent with actual contract terms could overwhelm even a well-staffed agency.

The Challenge of Proving Intent

Regulatory bodies often need to prove that a corporation willfully violated consumer protection laws or intentionally deceived the public. In many “bait-and-switch” scenarios, corporations argue that it was an honest mistake or an isolated incident. They might blame a “glitch” in their marketing system or claim that the consumer misread the terms. Without clear, “smoking gun” evidence (like an internal memo saying “we’ll trick customers on purpose”), regulators can find it challenging to mount a solid legal case.

The complaint in Boyer-Gomez references phone conversations in which a bank representative acknowledges multiple complaints about the same issue. Even if that acknowledgment were documented, Bank of America could respond that they were already in the process of investigating and that the marketing error was “unintentional.” Often, regulators’ hands are tied unless they can prove a broad, systematic pattern beyond a reasonable doubt in a legal sense.

Regulatory Capture

In a broader neoliberal framework, “regulatory capture” describes a scenario where agencies tasked with overseeing an industry become, in essence, dominated or overly influenced by the interests they are meant to regulate. While the complaint itself does not specifically invoke regulatory capture, the repeated references to other financial giants facing limited repercussions for large-scale misconduct can hint at a climate where corporate lobbying and political influence hamper robust enforcement.

If legislators or high-ranking officials have strong ties to the banking sector, the result may be diluted regulations or a culture of lenient enforcement. Critics often point out that banks deemed “too big to fail” or “too big to jail” can push the limits of consumer protection laws, confident that the worst penalty will be a settlement that barely dents their bottom line.

The Speed of Commerce vs. The Pace of Regulation

Another systemic issue is that corporations can change their tactics more quickly than regulatory changes can be drafted or passed. The complaint’s timeline is telling: The alleged “bait-and-switch” advertisement was discovered in mid-2024, but the official lawsuit was filed in January 2025. Even if the CFPB or another agency launched an investigation immediately after receiving relevant consumer complaints, building a case might take many months or years. Meanwhile, the bank can continue using (or slightly tweaking) its promotional materials.

This mismatch between rapid corporate innovation and slower government processes is a hallmark critique of neoliberal capitalism. Essentially, the “invisible hand” of the market is all too real in accelerating profit-seeking behaviors, while the protective hand of regulation lags behind.

Historical Precedents

Again, by way of general background, the financial industry has faced repeated controversies: from the 2008 mortgage crisis fueled by predatory lending practices to more recent allegations involving illegal account openings at some major banks. In many of these cases, regulators stepped in only after significant harm was done, and the solutions or penalties arrived well after the perpetrators had reaped billions in profits.

Applying that lens to credit card bonuses: The claims in Boyer-Gomez might represent just one more example of a wider phenomenon. If it were not for the Plaintiff’s personal diligence in saving promotional materials and filing a class action lawsuit, it’s conceivable that the alleged practice would never have come to light in a public forum. This indicates that systemic “red flags” can go unnoticed or unheeded at scale.

Why a Single Lawsuit Might Spark Change

Sometimes a single class action can expose a deeper pattern in ways that a regulator’s broader but less targeted approach may not. A lawsuit forces the corporate defendant to disclose internal documents (through discovery) that might reveal whether the alleged conduct was widespread. Moreover, a judge presiding over a class action can issue opinions or orders that carry legal weight beyond a single consumer’s claim.

In Massachusetts, the complaint leans on the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (M.G.L. c. 93A), which is known for its strong remedies, including treble damages. If the court determines that Bank of America “willfully or knowingly” violated 93A, the financial consequences could be more severe than a typical regulatory fine. This heightened liability might inspire the bank to settle and alter its practices—or to clarify once and for all that the original offer must be honored for all cardholders who received it.

The Broader “System Failure” Narrative

So, why does the complaint say regulators effectively did nothing? The short answer is: consumer protection authorities have finite resources, corporate defenses are robust, and proving intent or widespread wrongdoing can be an uphill battle. The slightly longer explanation is that the financial industry has deep pockets, legal expertise, and political influence that shape an environment in which questionable practices can endure—even after prior investigations or consent decrees.

This pattern is emblematic of a larger phenomenon in corporate accountability under neoliberal capitalism: the emphasis on shareholder profits can overshadow the moral or legal impetus to treat customers fairly. Regulators, though tasked with curbing abuses, struggle to keep up with the sheer volume of complaints and the intricacy of contractual fine print.

Potential Paths to Reform

Consumer advocates sometimes propose more vigorous enforcement and bigger penalties that cannot be brushed off as minor “operating expenses.” They call for transparent rulemaking that forces banks to clearly highlight promotional disclaimers in plain language, as well as more robust private rights of action so that consumers can effectively sue for significant damages when they experience deception.

In the case of Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, the Plaintiff is asking for relief that includes actual damages, treble damages, and injunctive relief—i.e., a court order forcing the bank to change how it administers bonus programs. If the suit is successful and the relief is granted at scale, it might help deter similar future conduct. However, these outcomes remain uncertain given that the judicial process can be protracted, and settlement negotiations can occur behind closed doors.

Conclusion to the “System Failure”

The complaint underscores that the impetus for real change in corporate behavior often rests more on class action litigation than on timely regulatory action. This might be read as evidence of a “system failure”—where consumer protection laws exist but are inconsistently enforced, and where a single lawsuit can highlight an alleged pattern that might otherwise remain invisible.

In the next section, we’ll examine how the complaint’s allegations and other historical data about similar tactics show that this alleged “predation” is not an accidental glitch but rather part of the financial industry’s repeated pattern—possibly a feature, not a bug, in the design of some marketing programs.

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5. This Pattern of Predation Is a Feature, Not a Bug

A key theme running through the Boyer-Gomez complaint—and many other class actions alleging deceptive marketing—is that these tactics are not merely incidental or occasional lapses in corporate compliance. Rather, they appear to be embedded strategies or “features” within a profit-focused system. In this section, we consider how the alleged bait-and-switch might reflect the normal functioning of a business culture shaped by neoliberal capitalism, in which maximizing shareholder profit can overshadow corporate social responsibility or corporate ethics.

Seeing the Forest for the Trees

One might try to dismiss the complaint’s allegations as an isolated misunderstanding—just a single consumer dealing with a big bank. However, the complaint itself specifically notes that the bank’s phone representatives reportedly acknowledged receiving “numerous” similar complaints. This directly challenges the notion that the incident was a mere anomaly. If the same pattern is repeated across multiple consumers, one must ask whether the bank’s marketing system or compliance checks were designed (or neglected) in a way that fosters these bait-and-switch outcomes.

Historically (in a broader sense), corporations frequently do cost-benefit analyses on how to present promotional offers. They may weigh:

1. Increased Sign-Ups: A bigger advertised bonus drives more applications.
2. Lower Fulfillment Costs: A portion of applicants will fail to meet the threshold, or the bank can default them into a less generous offer.
3. Minimal Backlash: Only a fraction of people will notice or file formal complaints.

If the net result is positive for the bottom line, the practice can become institutionalized. In such a scenario, you might see cyclical or repeated surges of consumer complaints whenever the gap between the advertised offer and the actual reward becomes too glaring. The complaint’s mention of the May 2024 CFPB report on credit card rewards frustrations is a clue that these cycles are well documented.

Linking to Larger Trends

From the vantage point of wealth disparity and corporate accountability, allegations such as these tie into a broader conversation about how big banks serve (or fail to serve) the public interest. Critics point to a pattern wherein large institutions:

• Attract customers with low initial APR or high reward deals.
• Gradually modify terms to increase fees or reduce benefits once the customer is “hooked.”
• Rely on the complexity of terms and fine print to ward off challenges.

The complaint contends that Bank of America led consumers to believe they were receiving a 70,000-mile + 40 XP bonus, only to quietly “switch” them to a 50,000-mile + 60 XP model. This shift might seem small, but in the aggregate, it can represent a sizeable cost savings or revenue boost for the bank. In a climate where shareholders demand quarterly growth, such incremental savings can be very attractive—even if they come at the expense of brand trust and consumer goodwill.

Predation as a Systemic Feature

Predatory business models are often discussed in the context of payday lending or subprime mortgages. But the credit card industry can exhibit parallel dynamics. Because banks hold substantial power—deciding credit limits, interest rates, and the specifics of reward programs—consumers can feel at a significant disadvantage if problems arise. The complexity of credit card agreements and the labyrinthine telephone menus that greet disgruntled customers can also deter challenges.

When looking at the complaint, it’s evident that the Plaintiff invested significant personal time trying to rectify the situation. He wrote letters, phoned the bank, and even cited the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. While the complaint doesn’t quantify how many hours he spent, it does note that he experienced frustration, wasted time, and lost opportunity. If that is the cost just to attempt recovering a couple hundred dollars’ worth of missing airline miles, many consumers might decide it is simpler to walk away. This structural discouragement is a hallmark of a system that arguably relies on a certain level of predatory complexity to maintain profitability.

Perpetual “Innovation” in Rewards Terms

Another angle is that “rewards programs” are constantly evolving. The complaint suggests that Bank of America was free to propose or mail out multiple versions of an Air France KLM World Elite Mastercard offer. One version gave 70,000 miles plus a certain amount of XP, another gave 50,000 miles plus less XP, yet another might exist somewhere in the bank’s marketing pipeline for a different subset of consumers. This segmentation is often defended as “targeted marketing.” However, it can also create confusion as to which terms apply to which consumer.

In some cases (outside the complaint, but documented in other consumer actions), banks have used “online only” disclaimers to say that a specific bonus is only valid if you apply through a particular webpage. If someone found the card through a different link, the bank can disclaim the more generous bonus. This kind of confusion or “fine print mismatch” often underlies lawsuits similar to Boyer-Gomez. The complaint references a prior CFPB enforcement action which found that Bank of America “violated the law when it offered sign-up bonuses only through online applications without clearly disclosing this limitation in marketing materials.”

Thus, it might be argued that the bank’s alleged repeated promotions and disclaimers are not a bug in the system, but an intentional feature that yields maximum sign-ups while limiting bonus payouts.

Could This Happen Elsewhere?

If one examines the energy sector, pharmaceutical corporations, or even e-commerce giants, the pattern of luring consumers with headline-worthy deals, only to adjust terms post-hoc, is not uncommon. For instance, free trials that automatically switch to paid subscriptions are frequently criticized as “dark patterns” in marketing. Corporate pollution cases sometimes hinge on the idea that a company presents a “green” or “eco-friendly” face while privately cutting corners on environmental compliance. The logic of broad-based capitalism often fosters a “do first, ask forgiveness later” approach—especially if the initial wrongdoing is profitable enough to outweigh potential liabilities.

In credit cards, the lines can blur between legitimate promotional offers and misleading half-truths. The complaint hints that consumers are increasingly speaking out—particularly through CFPB complaints—when they realize they have been misled. Nonetheless, if the structural incentives remain the same, one might predict a recurrence of these lawsuits in the future.

The Consumer’s Role in a Predatory Landscape

Critics of the system sometimes argue that the onus should not be on consumers to constantly police these changes. Under a more robust regime of corporate accountability, banks would have to clearly confirm the final terms of any credit card promotion—and if they fail to do so, they face swift and certain penalties. Yet, in the current environment, the individual consumer often becomes the detective, the litigator, and the squeaky wheel who must compile evidence and file complaints or lawsuits.

The complaint’s mention that the Plaintiff demanded the bank provide copies of his agreement—and was repeatedly refused—highlights the power imbalance. If indeed the bank holds all the documentation that could confirm or deny the Plaintiff’s claims but refuses to release it, the consumer is left at a disadvantage. Only through litigation might the Plaintiff succeed in compelling the bank to produce relevant records.

Normalizing the “Bait-and-Switch” Mindset

One of the more unsettling aspects of the allegations is the idea that “bait-and-switch” might be a normalized tactic. If repeated enough, consumers come to expect that some portion of a promotional promise may be revoked or altered after they sign up. This cultural normalization can reduce overall trust in the market. And ironically, that might also reduce the impetus for strong consumer advocacy if people believe “it’s just the way things are.”

However, from the vantage point of ethical banking, it should not be “just how things are.” If proven, the bank’s alleged misconduct would constitute a clear breach of contract, or at least a breach of good faith and fair dealing—basic pillars of commercial transactions. The complaint’s invocation of Massachusetts law is an attempt to show that such predatory conduct is not only unethical but also illegal. Yet the repeated references to prior CFPB actions suggest that even when the bank has been called out before, the underlying incentives have not changed enough to prevent the reemergence of similar practices.

Conclusion of This Section

Ultimately, the complaint Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A. can be read as a microcosm of a deeper, recurring pattern in the financial world. The Plaintiff’s story mirrors a broader phenomenon where corporations prioritize marketing hype and short-term profit, occasionally crossing ethical or legal lines to do so. This suits the logic of neoliberal capitalism, which prizes private profits and minimal government interference. In that world, what looks like a predatory or deceptive practice is, to some corporate strategists, just another line item in an annual earnings report.

Having analyzed how predatory marketing can become embedded in corporate culture, our investigation now turns to the tactics corporations use to handle blowback once these practices are exposed. Specifically, we will examine “The PR Playbook of Damage Control,” identifying the common themes in a major corporation’s response to consumer uproar and legal claims.

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6. The PR Playbook of Damage Control

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By the time a consumer complaint matures into a class action lawsuit—like Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A.—the public relations machinery of a large corporation typically springs into action. While the complaint does not document Bank of America’s public response, one can glean from past corporate crises how large institutions attempt to manage the narrative. This section outlines those well-worn PR tactics (as general context) and notes how they might manifest in a case involving alleged credit card bait-and-switch practices.

1. Minimization or Denial

The first step in corporate crisis management often involves downplaying the scope or severity of the allegations. Companies might release anodyne statements such as, “We take these claims seriously, but believe them to be without merit.” In some instances, they will brand the entire incident as an isolated misunderstanding. If enough cardholders fail to come forward or the complaint never reaches class certification, the company can maintain this posture with minimal repercussions.

In the Boyer-Gomez complaint, the bank’s letter directly to the Plaintiff indicated it “did not identify a bank error.” While not a public statement, it fits the pattern: a blanket denial of wrongdoing, placing responsibility on the customer to “understand the terms.” Such a stance, if repeated publicly, might reinforce a narrative that the Plaintiff misunderstood or misapplied the offer.

2. Shifting Blame

Another common PR maneuver is shifting blame to something external, such as a “vendor error,” “software glitch,” or “miscommunication.” Even if the company eventually offers a partial remedy, they may portray themselves as just as surprised and inconvenienced as the customer. For instance, if the bank eventually concedes that two promotions were inadvertently conflated, they could imply that an outside marketing partner inadvertently distributed the wrong materials.

Though the complaint references no such official statement from Bank of America, the broader context suggests that large financial institutions have used these arguments before—be it about software errors, call-center misunderstandings, or third-party marketing agencies.

3. Quietly Issuing Refunds to the “Noisiest” Customers

A well-documented approach (outside the complaint, but observed in other consumer cases) is to rectify the mistake for consumers who press the issue fiercely—while not proactively fixing it for all who are similarly situated. This can keep the problem off the public’s radar. In Boyer-Gomez, the Plaintiff claims that even his repeated demands and reference to the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act did not secure the higher bonus or any restitution. That suggests either the bank had a firmer stance than usual, or the issue was large enough that giving in for one consumer risked an avalanche of claims from others. If, however, the lawsuit had not gone public, Bank of America might have quietly settled with the Plaintiff in a confidential arrangement—forestalling broader public attention.

4. Emphasizing Corporate Social Responsibility

In parallel with addressing the specifics of the complaint, companies often pivot to highlight their philanthropic or socially responsible initiatives. For instance, they may tout charitable giving, community investment, or environmental programs, overshadowing negative publicity about consumer deception. By saturating social media and mainstream outlets with positive stories about volunteerism or sustainability, they can shift public attention away from the lawsuit.

As part of a broader narrative, critics argue that this is an attempt to obscure or distract from allegations of corporate greed. While it is entirely possible for an institution to genuinely invest in positive social outcomes, the timing of public relations pushes is often suspiciously aligned with damaging controversies or lawsuits.

5. Partial Mea Culpa and “Updated Policies”

If the lawsuit gains traction, the next rung in the PR ladder might be a partial admission of confusion or error, coupled with a vow to “update policies.” For instance, the bank might announce that they have clarified promotional terms on their website, or that they have improved call-center scripts to prevent miscommunication. Typically, such announcements do not involve a full acknowledgment of guilt or wrongdoing. Instead, they frame the changes as part of an ongoing commitment to “excellence in service” or “transparency in rewards.”

Should regulators step in, the bank might sign a consent decree that imposes a nominal fine and compels them to provide clearer disclosures going forward. Once the dust settles, the bank can highlight that they cooperated with regulators and swiftly implemented changes, continuing to deny that any deceptive intent existed in the first place. As of this writing, no such scenario has unfolded publicly in Boyer-Gomez, but these patterns are well established in the financial sector.

6. Sealing Settlements and Non-Disclosure Agreements

One reason certain corporate practices can persist so long is that big institutions often settle claims under terms that require plaintiffs to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). If the class action is not certified or gets settled on an individual basis, the corporation might maintain secrecy about how many cardholders were affected or how many millions of dollars were in dispute. The complaint does not specifically mention NDAs, but it is common in class actions for a settlement to be approved by the court and for certain details—like the total class size or average payout per member—to be somewhat obscured.

By leveraging NDAs, corporations keep a tight lid on the details that could tarnish their brand or invite further litigation. While the lead plaintiff might receive a relatively generous settlement, the rest of the potential class remains unaware. This allows the cycle to continue, fueling claims that the system fosters repeated patterns of corporate corruption or greed.

7. Leveraging Influential Allies

Finally, large corporations often engage law firms and lobbying groups with powerful political connections. In a broader sense, these alliances can dampen the effect of negative publicity, steer legislative efforts away from imposing heavier penalties, and shape the media narrative. For instance, if a large bank has strong ties to certain community organizations or donates to philanthropic efforts in major urban centers, local leaders may be less inclined to criticize or investigate them publicly.

In the context of Bank of America, it is well documented that they have wide-ranging community initiatives and charitable partnerships. While these partnerships may be beneficial in many respects, from a PR standpoint they also serve as bulwarks against reputational damage. If the lawsuit does not galvanize enough public outrage or media coverage, the net effect of a well-funded PR campaign may overshadow the alleged consumer harm.

The Effect on Public Opinion and Consumer Advocacy

As these PR strategies unfold, the average consumer may remain unaware or uncertain about the underlying allegations in a lawsuit like Boyer-Gomez. Unless the media devotes significant coverage to the case—and spells out the implications—many people assume it is either frivolous or does not apply to them. As a result, systemic issues can remain unchallenged.

Consumer advocacy groups, however, often try to break through the corporate PR spin by issuing press releases that dissect the lawsuit’s allegations, distributing step-by-step guides to victims who may be eligible to join a class action, and lobbying for stronger consumer protection measures. Their success varies widely depending on the media environment and public interest levels.

Why PR Tactics Sometimes Fall Short

Despite a polished PR playbook, there are instances where consumer fury or evidence of widespread harm becomes too large to ignore. For example, if thousands of customers contact news outlets or local representatives, or if social media amplifies personal stories of wrongdoing, the narrative can quickly turn against the corporation. In that event, the bank might expedite its damage control phase, offering restitution or improved terms to calm the uproar.

From the vantage point of corporate ethics, some executives may genuinely wish to rectify mistakes once they understand them. But if mid-level managers are rewarded for short-term profit gains, the impetus to keep these tactics going can be strong. When controversies become too big, top leaders intervene—but by then, the public trust may be eroded.

Conclusion on the PR Playbook

While Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America is still in its early stages, the complaint hints at a scenario in which any official public response might either downplay or outright deny the alleged deception. The common PR blueprint suggests that if external pressure intensifies, the bank could shift tactics: perhaps quietly granting the rightful rewards to some or all affected consumers, or announcing superficial policy changes while insisting no wrongdoing occurred.

Yet for those pushing for genuine corporate accountability and an end to bait-and-switch marketing, the real challenge lies in moving beyond spin. Only consistent legal pressure, robust regulatory oversight, and effective consumer advocacy can disrupt the cycle. If the allegations prove true—and if more consumers step forward—this complaint could become a rallying point for meaningful changes in how credit card rewards are advertised and delivered.

In the final section, we’ll discuss how “Corporate Power vs. Public Interest” frames the heart of this issue, along with the potential pathways to a fairer, more equitable system of consumer finance.

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7. Corporate Power vs. Public Interest

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We arrive at the concluding section, where the friction between corporate power and public interest takes center stage. The allegations in Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A. serve as a microcosm of a broader struggle: on one side, a consumer (and potentially many others) who simply wants the promised benefits from a credit card rewards program; on the other, a corporate behemoth driven by profit motives, possibly employing carefully managed marketing and PR machines to safeguard its bottom line.

The Essence of the Conflict

The complaint sets the stage for this battle in explicit terms, accusing Bank of America of enticing customers with a superior rewards offer, only to apply a lesser one. In purely contractual terms, it sounds straightforwardly unfair. Yet the alleged mismatch persisted despite the Plaintiff’s repeated calls and letters, culminating in a lawsuit that references prior CFPB findings of “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” by the same bank in the realm of rewards.

This friction—between the customer’s demand for the contract’s benefits and the corporation’s intangible pressure to cut costs—embodies the tension at the heart of corporate accountability. Under neoliberal capitalism, corporations are tasked with maximizing shareholder returns. This can create an environment where every consumer-facing practice is optimized for profit. If left unchecked, such optimization can cross into unethical or unlawful territory, as the complaint maintains.

Consequences for the Broader Public

1. Economic Fallout: When banks systematically deny or reduce rewards, or charge hidden fees, it leads to a transfer of wealth from consumers to the financial institution. Critics argue this intensifies wealth disparity and undermines consumer trust in the financial system.
2. Eroded Trust in Institutions: Frequent stories of “bait-and-switch” or “gotcha” clauses can breed cynicism. Over time, the public may come to view all promotional offers with suspicion, which can hamper healthy competition and degrade the overall market ecosystem.
3. Consumer Harm Beyond Dollars: The alleged deception causes stress, confusion, and wasted time for consumers. It also fosters an environment of learned helplessness, where people feel they cannot meaningfully challenge a major bank’s decisions.
4. Disempowerment of Smaller Players: If larger banks use unscrupulous tactics to attract and retain customers, smaller, more ethical institutions may struggle to compete without adopting some version of those tactics—or risk losing market share.

Pathways to Address the Imbalance

• Stronger Consumer Protection Laws: One route is to tighten the enforcement of existing laws like M.G.L. c. 93A in Massachusetts or to replicate similarly powerful statutes elsewhere. Class actions that impose significant damages can shift a bank’s cost-benefit analysis, making deceptive practices less appealing.
• Increased Transparency: Requiring banks to clearly highlight changes in promotional terms—through standardized notices—could reduce confusion. If disclaimers must be in large, bold print (not buried in a multi-page document), it becomes harder to trick consumers about which offer they received.
• Public Awareness Campaigns: Consumer advocacy groups can educate the public about frequent “bait-and-switch” red flags. For instance, they might advise consumers always to demand a copy of their original agreement and to confirm any changes in writing.
• Empowered Regulators: Adequate funding and authority for agencies like the CFPB would help them systematically audit reward programs rather than waiting for a critical mass of consumer complaints.

Skepticism About Corporate Change

A consistent thread in activism around corporate accountability is skepticism regarding whether major banks will ever meaningfully change if the profit incentives remain. The complaint implies that Bank of America’s alleged misconduct recurred even after prior CFPB actions—highlighting that regulatory interventions or fines might not suffice unless they are hefty enough to deter future violations.

Moreover, the scale and complexity of large financial institutions can hamper genuine reform. Even if top executives declare zero tolerance for deceptive marketing, the people designing day-to-day offers might revert to subtle tactics that push legal boundaries—especially if they are rewarded for short-term revenue. This dynamic is often characterized as a “tug-of-war” between compliance mandates and revenue imperatives.

Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Shareholder Primacy

Many corporations publish annual reports on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in which they proclaim commitments to ethical behavior, community development, and fair dealings with customers. However, critics note that these commitments can ring hollow if the actual business model remains reliant on hidden fees, credit card reward shortfalls, or other borderline conduct.

In Boyer-Gomez, the complaint references a scenario that is anything but socially responsible if proven: a consumer invests time and money under specific contract terms, only to be told the agreement is not what it seemed. If the bank truly embraced the CSR principle of transparency, one might expect immediate correction of such errors—and a robust system for making sure they never happen again. Instead, the complaint suggests the bank simply stuck to its lesser promotional deal, downplaying or refusing to acknowledge wrongdoing.

The Role of Class Action Litigation

The lawsuit underscores how class actions remain one of the few mechanisms for addressing widespread corporate wrongdoing. By enabling a large group of similarly affected consumers to come together, class actions can create a financial threat big enough to catch a giant bank’s attention. This, in turn, can push the institution to negotiate a settlement or face trial. Class actions can also reveal internal documents that clarify whether the alleged wrongdoing was indeed widespread and deliberate.

Yet class actions are hardly a panacea. Settlements can be sealed, the payout per consumer may be modest, and the cycle can repeat. The complaint’s emphasis on injunctive relief and demands for changes in how the bank runs its promotions might, if successful, create longer-term reform. But that, too, depends on rigorous judicial oversight or future monitoring agreements.

The Moral Center: Public Interest

Banking, at its core, is supposed to serve public needs: safeguarding deposits, facilitating payments, and extending credit responsibly. Marketing a credit card with inflated promises, if that is what occurred, runs counter to that mission. The complaint’s moral thrust is that the bank’s alleged actions are a disservice to the public interest—a direct contradiction of the trust customers place in financial institutions.

Beyond this single case, it begs the question: What other corners might be cut? Once a bank is comfortable with small-scale bait-and-switch tactics, might it also embrace questionable practices in fee structures, loan servicing, or credit reporting disputes? This is why consumer advocates are vigilant. A willingness to mislead in one product line can signal deeper issues in corporate culture.

Concluding Reflections

In Boyer-Gomez v. Bank of America, N.A., a relatively modest dispute—essentially about a missing 20,000 bonus miles and some XP—becomes a window into systemic corporate practices. Viewed through the lens of neoliberal capitalism, it illustrates how profit motives can overshadow corporate ethics and corporate social responsibility, especially when regulatory frameworks and consumer class actions struggle to keep pace.

Even if the Plaintiff recovers his lost bonus, the broader conflict endures: will major financial institutions reevaluate their incentive structures to genuinely prioritize fair treatment of customers, or will they continue to push marketing to the legal (and perhaps ethical) limit in search of higher returns?

Consumers, regulators, and courts have a role to play in answering that question. Whether through more robust regulations, larger financial penalties, or public outcry, the system can be nudged toward accountability. For now, the complaint stands as a stark reminder that corporate power vs. public interest is not an abstract debate but a daily reality for millions of people using financial products around the world.

If anything, the allegations in Boyer-Gomez reaffirm the importance of consumer vigilance and the continuing need for robust legal mechanisms to expose and redress deceptive practices. Until the underlying incentives shift or enforcement becomes more uniformly effective, bait-and-switch controversies may remain a “feature, not a bug” of the modern corporate landscape.

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