[1] Introduction

The Environmental Conservation and Chemical Corporation (ECC) Superfund Site near Zionsville, Indiana, stands as a constant reminder of how, under neoliberal capitalism, industrial mismanagement and corporate greed can linger for decades—long after the initial headlines fade.

The legal filings in the Stipulation and Order Amending Consent Decree and Modifying Exhibit A—along with its predecessors—offer a window into an arduous and often troubling timeline of corporate conduct, alleged evasions, and incomplete cleanup efforts. This story begins with allegations involving large-scale hazardous substance contamination that first drew federal and state authorities to the ECC Site decades ago.

From the start, the most damning evidence pointed to a classic case of corporate misconduct: soil and groundwater at the ECC Site were laden with hazardous chemicals that had seeped into the environment over time, and initial remedial measures repeatedly failed to meet federal cleanup standards. Indeed, the legal source details how a Soil Vapor Extraction (SVE) system, installed to treat contamination, did not achieve the requisite cleanup goals and left the surrounding area facing persistent threats to public health and local ecology. Despite multiple consent decrees, amendments, and “Additional Work” directives, the responsible corporate parties—collectively referred to in the filings as Settling Defendants—required frequent regulatory prodding and fresh legal mandates to keep them on track.

The original 1991 Consent Decree was supposed to ensure a rapid, systematic cleanup. But as the years wore on, one shortfall followed another. Major modifications in 1998, 1999, 2006, and now 2024 highlight a repeated pattern: once the agreed-upon fixes proved insufficient, the responsible parties were compelled—often belatedly—to adapt or entirely replace their cleanup strategy. The legal documents details how new plans were brought online, from partial covers to collection trenches to more complex extraction wells, only to be met with further complications. The site’s soil and groundwater contamination proved more persistent than initially admitted or anticipated.

Through the legal filings, we also see glimpses of a larger systemic issue. The ECC Site story illustrates the all-too-common dynamic under neoliberal capitalism: corporate behavior guided by profit-maximization and the tendency to treat fines, lawsuits, and lengthy remedial obligations as the mere “cost of doing business.” This investigative narrative will track how these allegations reveal deeper, structural concerns, including deregulation, regulatory capture, and corporate strategies designed to minimize financial exposure rather than restore impacted communities’ well-being.

Below is a comprehensive look at the ECC Site’s long, convoluted cleanup saga, divided into eleven sections. We begin by delving deeper into the corporate actions that so often left local residents and the environment in peril. From there, we examine how repeated “Additional Work” orders and legal battles exemplify a regulatory system stretched thin and pitted against large corporations. We will also explore how these issues threaten corporate social responsibility, accelerate wealth disparity, and reflect a broader culture of corporate ethics shortfalls under modern capitalism.

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[2] Corporate Intent Exposed

The legal source document lays bare the corporate misconduct that necessitated oversight from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Indiana. In the earliest phases, the government accused ECC and numerous other defendants of allowing hazardous chemicals to contaminate soil and groundwater at the Site. Under CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act), polluters were supposed to finance and execute a comprehensive cleanup. Yet the record reveals how the corporate actors involved were consistently slow to fulfill their obligations.

Central to these allegations is the idea that corporations, once they realize they face significant liabilities for pollution, begin to test the limits of regulation. Rather than act swiftly and thoroughly to remove contamination, the record shows a pattern of incrementalism and half-measures. First, the SVE system was installed—a technology that uses vacuum pressure to remove volatile contaminants from the soil. Though it can be effective, the system was not maintained or operated in a manner sufficient to meet the legal cleanup requirements. Over time, the EPA found that the contaminated soils still posed a significant threat to groundwater and to local residents.

The corporate intent, while not spelled out in overt confessions, appears traceable through the repeated modifications demanded by regulators. Each time the existing approach proved inadequate, the corporate defendants would adjust—but often only after further negotiation. Notably, the amendments detail a complex web of new responsibilities: additional trench systems to intercept contaminated water, permeable reactive gates that were to treat the tainted flow, and expansions of the RCRA-compliant cover (a specialized cap designed to keep contaminants from migrating). Each step was a reaction to newly discovered or ongoing releases, a testament to the difficulty of ensuring a thorough cleanup when polluters choose minimal compliance over meaningful hazard eradication.

From a broader perspective, the government’s allegations and subsequent legal measures underscore a telling aspect of neoliberal capitalism: The typical corporate stance is to comply only so far as it is forced by regulation or threatened by legal penalties. The revelations about the SVE system failing to meet standards—and the subsequent delays—offer an enlightening portrait of how corporations may be motivated by a desire to minimize expenses rather than ensure the total protection of community health.

Perhaps the greatest piece of evidence pointing to a less-than-good-faith approach is the repeated necessity for the U.S. Department of Justice to intervene on behalf of the EPA. Each time “Additional Work” was formally added, it represented another instance in which the initial promises and designs fell short. Critically, the source underscores that the new solutions were only implemented after the agencies discovered that earlier cleanup efforts had failed to meet the required benchmarks.

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[3] The Corporations Get Away With It

The legal amendments reveal many ways that corporations use existing legal and administrative processes to forestall or limit liability. One primary mechanism is the protracted negotiation over the specific scope of Additional Work. Whenever the SVE system or the RCRA Compliant Cap proved insufficient, the relevant corporate entities could effectively stall by proposing updated designs, seeking repeated consultations, or revisiting the technical feasibility of solutions—while contamination continued to seep further into the environment.

These tactics are aided by regulatory complexity. CERCLA’s process for remedy selection typically involves multiple steps—Records of Decision (RODs), Explanation of Significant Differences (ESDs), feasibility studies, public comment periods, and so forth. While these steps are crucial for thorough environmental decision-making, they also create ample space for those with deep pockets and skilled legal counsel to slow progress. In this sense, the “system” can be as much a friend to polluters as it is a safeguard for the public—particularly when corporate lawyers exploit every permissible channel for delay or cost-saving compromise.

Consider, for instance, that the earliest Consent Decree was formulated in 1991, yet by 2003, the EPA determined that key elements of the remedy had not achieved the necessary cleanup standards. By 2006, the parties were forced to incorporate an Explanation of Significant Differences, installing a permeable reactive gate system (PRGS) that was supposed to treat contaminated water in the trench system. Then, in 2011, more complications emerged— the PRGS was “not adequate,” requiring further investigation. Meanwhile, changes in the water volume, rainfall infiltration, and the discovery of contamination migrating south of the Site forced yet another set of amendments.

Throughout this labyrinthine process, the corporate defendants were not exactly “ignoring” regulators. Instead, they repeatedly negotiated the shape and extent of their legal obligations, staying within the letter of the law as interpreted through each new Consent Decree modification. In doing so, they effectively “got away with it”: The site remained contaminated for years, and cleanup obligations never truly ended, but the burden was constantly reconfigured and recalibrated in a slow and reactive manner.

This phenomenon is especially visible in the story of the Additional Work triggered whenever remedial goals fell short. Each time the standard was not met, the “Parties”—i.e., the EPA, the state, and the corporate defendants—sat down to hammer out new obligations. The legal documents meticulously list expansions of the remedy, new extraction wells, new cap extensions, and so forth. Yet these expansions often came only after a recognized failure or new discovery of contamination. By the time each fix was implemented, contamination had taken root in deeper layers of soil or migrated further away from the original source.

So reading through the legal record reveals that the corporations leveraged looping negotiations and complex legal frameworks to extend their window of partial compliance. As long as regulators required more evidence or more negotiation, or as long as new “design reports” needed to be approved, the corporations could stall and thereby externalize much of the actual cost and liability for the contamination onto the local environment and local communities.

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[4] The Cost of Doing Business

One of the refrains in discussions about corporate misconduct is that the fines, legal fees, and partial remediation efforts become just another “cost of doing business.” This phrase arises from the well-documented reality that many corporations weigh the expense of potential sanctions against the potential gains of continuing risky or irresponsible behavior. In the context of the ECC Site, the legal source repeatedly references not only the cost-sharing among the many original defendants—235 at the start—but also the ongoing financial responsibilities hammered out in the amendments.

The defendants are required to reimburse the EPA and the State for “oversight costs” which can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars or more. However, in the big picture of a corporation’s balance sheets, these sums can be dwarfed by profits or the long-term cost of constructing truly robust environmental safeguards from the outset. The 1991 Consent Decree established initial parameters for paying these oversight costs, but each subsequent modification reaffirmed or adjusted that obligation.

Significantly, the legal text notes that the total liability for “oversight costs” was capped at $850,000 for certain periods, ensuring that if the companies pay that amount, the State agrees to waive or settle claims for anything above it for that timeframe. This type of cap can inadvertently encourage slow compliance because the company knows its maximum exposure. If cleanup overshoots certain deadlines or if extra remedial work is required, the corporate ledger might already have planned for that scenario as part of the standard operating costs.

Moreover, the repeated references to design changes, additional wells, barrier walls, and more advanced technologies illustrate an ever-increasing set of technical expenditures—yet these expenditures only came after contamination had been allowed to persist. Some might argue that if the polluters had simply invested in robust solutions at the outset, the total cost—financially, socially, and environmentally—would have been significantly lower. Instead, a strategy that draws out negotiations can create a vicious cycle: short-term savings for the responsible company, longer-term public harm, and eventual, higher cleanup costs borne in large part by the government, local communities, and sometimes the corporation itself.

From an economic standpoint, this reveals a fundamental flaw in profit-maximization as the driving force in environmental matters. When corporations are primarily measured by quarterly returns, investing heavily in thorough, upfront remediation can appear unprofitable. This is precisely why the legal framework of environmental cleanup—particularly under CERCLA—attempts to impose “joint and several liability” upon polluters. But as the ECC Site story indicates, liability alone is insufficient when enforcement is bogged down in decades-long amendments and re-negotiations.

Ultimately, the repeated changes to the remedy—SVE expansions, extraction well installations, barrier walls, and cap extensions—illustrate how the real “cost of doing business” is often paid by local ecosystems and vulnerable communities. Over the same decades that the ECC Site has been in flux, the local population has had to wonder whether the water they drink or the air they breathe is truly safe. That intangible cost can hardly be captured by the line items in a corporate ledger.

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[5] Systemic Failures

The ECC Site’s drawn-out cleanup process underscores the broader systemic failures inherent in the interplay between large corporations and governmental agencies under neoliberal capitalism. While the letter of the law under CERCLA requires prompt cleanup and imposes liability on responsible parties, the reality is that enforcement is costly, time-consuming, and subject to significant political pressure.

A prime example is the constant redefinition of “Exhibit A,” a key portion of the Consent Decree meant to specify the remedial action plan. The 1991 version was replaced in 1998, which was modified again in 1999, then revisited in 2006, and finally updated through the 2024 Stipulation. Each revision introduced new obligations, typically in response to evidence that contamination levels were still in excess of permissible limits. On paper, this iterative approach might sound like prudent adaptation. However, when viewed over the course of thirty years, it reads as a repeated failure by both regulators and the corporations to finalize a sustainable remedy for the environment.

The question arises: why did this site remain in limbo for so long? There is no simple answer, but factors likely include:

1. Regulatory Capture: Large corporations have the resources to lobby for more lenient regulations or interpret existing rules in ways that minimize their immediate compliance costs. The repeated negotiations in the ECC Site’s history may reflect a broader pattern where regulatory bodies must compromise with corporate attorneys to get partial concessions.
2. Chronic Underfunding of Regulators: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and state agencies often operate with constrained budgets, limiting the number of personnel who can deeply investigate or swiftly enforce complex technical cleanup requirements. Overworked staff might find it more manageable to accept incremental progress rather than wage protracted legal battles.
3. Inefficient Legal Frameworks: CERCLA’s provisions can be unwieldy, and while they enable the government to mandate cleanup, the path from filing a complaint to completing an effective remedy is littered with bureaucratic steps that can be exploited for delay.
4. Profit-Driven Incentives: For the corporate defendants, every dollar spent on immediate, thorough remediation is a dollar not accruing to shareholders. Corporate boards, driven by the logic of profit-maximization, may see legal pushback and negotiation as the rational economic choice.

These systemic failures echo far beyond the ECC Site. Across the United States—and indeed globally— similar stories unfold where toxic contamination, once discovered, lingers for years while polluters and regulators wrestle in court or attempt partial fixes. The longer the contamination remains, the greater the risk to public health and environmental well-being.

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[6] This Pattern of Predation Is a Feature, Not a Bug

When I use terms like like “corporate greed” or “corporate corruption,” I’m often referring to conduct that knowingly puts profits above social and environmental responsibilities. In the context of hazardous waste sites, this behavior reveals itself through slow compliance, minimal investment in safety measures, and a willingness to contest or downplay the severity of contamination. The ECC Site’s protracted timeline of partial solutions— culminating in repeated modifications to the remediation plan—mirrors a larger pattern witnessed in industries ranging from petrochemicals to mining to pharmaceuticals.

Under neoliberal capitalism, these patterns are not accidents or aberrations. Rather, they are the logical outcome of a system that prizes corporate returns over the public good. When a corporation pollutes, it can often anticipate that immediate cleanup costs will be high and might reduce quarterly profits, so there is an incentive to respond with the bare minimum required by law. If the law leaves room for negotiation—or if the corporation can draw out the process—the corporation may continue to externalize cleanup costs onto society.

What the ECC case demonstrates is that this behavior is rarely a one-off event. The presence of 235 defendants at one point in the original legal action suggests a complex supply chain of waste generators, transporters, and site operators—each potentially acting with incomplete knowledge or wanting to “cut corners” to save on disposal fees. This labyrinth of responsibility can take decades to unravel, by which time local communities suffer the fallout. The cyclical pattern—pollution, partial cleanup, new legal action, amended settlement—thrives on legal technicalities and can be repeated in any sector with hazardous by-products.

Moreover, large-scale corporate entities often have entire teams devoted to “risk management” or “litigation strategy.” The consistent use of “Additional Work” clauses in the ECC Site settlement reflects a dynamic where new technical solutions are demanded only when existing solutions fail. Instead of a single, unequivocal push to thoroughly remove contamination, we see incremental steps, each subject to negotiation and potential delays. This is not simply a glitch in the system; it reveals how the system is designed to accommodate corporations seeking to minimize their immediate liabilities. Hence, for critics of neoliberal capitalism, the ECC Site fiasco is emblematic of the assertion that “this pattern of predation is a feature, not a bug.”

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[7] The PR Playbook of Damage Control

One of the ironies of corporate crises is that, in parallel with the legal battles, many companies roll out public-relations campaigns to reassure stakeholders—especially investors, local communities, and regulators—that they are responsibly addressing the issues. While the legal source itself does not detail the internal PR strategies of the defendants, the broader corporate pattern is well understood: companies emphasize cooperation with regulators, tout new cleanup technologies, and host press events that celebrate partial milestones.

Common features of the “PR Playbook” might include:

• Touting Technical Complexities: Companies often portray the site’s contamination as a scientifically intricate problem that takes time and caution to solve. While there can indeed be genuine complexity, the narrative can become an excuse for slow remediation.
• Highlighting Partial Successes: If a certain portion of the site has been cleaned or if contamination levels drop slightly in one area, corporate spokespeople may focus on these improvements, downplaying the broader contamination that remains.
• Framing the Company as an Environmental Steward: Through website statements, local news interviews, or philanthropic donations, the responsible corporation may attempt to rebrand itself as “part of the solution,” even as it resists or negotiates the scope of additional remediation behind closed doors.
• Citing Ongoing Investments: The repeated changes to the remedy—such as installing new trenches or extraction wells—can be spun as “evidence” of corporate dedication. In reality, these additions often happen only under legal compulsion.

While the legal text at hand focuses on the technical and enforcement angles, it does list “monthly progress reports” that Settling Defendants must submit. These reports, while beneficial to oversight agencies, also serve as fodder for corporate PR, because portions of the data can be selectively used to claim progress is being made. Over time, the risk is that local communities are lulled into thinking the problem is nearly solved—until the next set of modifications reveals the persistently high levels of contamination.

It’s worth noting that PR campaigns can become more intense when there is heightened public scrutiny. If local media outlets or environmental advocacy groups highlight the creeping pace of cleanup, companies will often double down on messaging about “commitment” and “transparency.” But behind the scenes, as evidenced by the repeated amendments, the actual story is one of partial compliance spurred by enforcement actions rather than voluntary altruism.

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[8] Corporate Power vs. Public Interest

The protracted timeline for addressing the ECC Site contamination throws into sharp relief the tension between corporate power and the public interest. While government agencies, nonprofits, and citizens push for swift and thorough remediation, the controlling corporate players often favor incremental steps. Because these corporations bring legal teams, consultants, and financing to the table, they can slow or redirect the cleanup process in ways that an overburdened regulatory system struggles to counter effectively.

In the United States, the principle behind corporate social responsibility is that businesses are morally and ethically obliged to account for the social and environmental impacts of their operations. Yet, in practice, real accountability only emerges when the threat of sanctions is high enough to offset the benefits of inaction. As the ECC case demonstrates, even with CERCLA’s liability provisions, it often takes decades to see tangible progress—highlighting the gap between the ideal of social responsibility and the realities of corporate conduct under market-driven imperatives.

Additionally, the local public can be at a distinct disadvantage in understanding the full scope of risk. Environmental contamination is invisible and complex, requiring technical knowledge to grasp. Government agencies strive to provide information, but the slow drip of data can make it difficult for average residents to realize the extent of ongoing hazards. Meanwhile, corporations can tap into extensive PR, legal, and scientific resources to shape the narrative.

That same tension—between the well-being of communities and the vested interests of corporations—plays out on a broader scale wherever contamination or hazardous emissions occur. The ECC Site is a microcosm of how, under neoliberal capitalism, industries can overshadow local voices, especially when short-term profit is at odds with the cost of robust cleanup. Indeed, many environmental justice advocates argue that the entire dynamic reveals the deeper flaw of letting private entities weigh intangible community harm against their financial bottom line.

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[9] The Human Toll on Workers and Communities

Behind every statistic about contamination levels or RCRA-compliant caps lies the reality of potential public-health impacts. Many residents living near the ECC Site have likely experienced ongoing anxiety and fear about what lurks in their groundwater or the vapors that might be rising from polluted soils. Although the legal document does not go into the health status of the local population, the presence of known or suspected carcinogens at a Superfund site typically triggers concern for increased cancer risk, respiratory issues, or other chronic illnesses.

Likewise, the economic fallout can be significant. Properties near a Superfund site often suffer from reduced property values, making it more difficult for families to sell their homes or maintain equity. Local businesses that depend on clean water—such as agriculture or food processing—could face extra costs or reputational risks if contamination fears become public knowledge. Over the decades, these economic burdens accumulate, with residents effectively paying for corporate negligence.

Furthermore, workers involved in partial cleanup might themselves face occupational hazards. While well-trained remediation teams follow strict safety protocols, repeated changes to the design and scope of the remedy can lead to confusion or oversight. The repeated attempts to fix the SVE system, for instance, might mean new construction sites, repeated trench digging, and handling of contaminated soil or water. Each phase presents potential danger if not handled with utmost care and adequate funding.

On the social level, the sense of betrayal or powerlessness can erode trust in both corporate leadership and government oversight. Residents may wonder why, after so many years and so many “final” remedies, the contamination has not been fully addressed. The perceived failure of institutions to safeguard public health can heighten cynicism and hamper civic engagement. Worse, in some communities, families move away—disrupting neighborhood ties and local economies.

Among environmental justice advocates, there is a consistent concern that vulnerable populations—low-income households, communities of color—shoulder a disproportionate share of such burdens. While the ECC Site’s community demographics are not detailed in the legal text, the pattern of “corporations pollute, communities suffer” repeats across the country. This phenomenon drives a wedge into local societies, sometimes exacerbating wealth disparity by pushing those with means to relocate while leaving behind residents trapped in devalued properties with uncertain health outcomes.

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[10] Global Trends in Corporate Accountability

Though the ECC Site is located in Indiana, the themes uncovered here echo far beyond the American Midwest. Around the globe, multinational corporations have contributed to similarly dire pollution scenarios, from open-pit mines in South America to chemical factories in Eastern Europe. The parallels are striking: repeated legal battles, partial remedies, ongoing contamination, and communities left to wonder if their basic environmental resources will ever be restored.

Some nations have tried to bolster corporate accountability measures. The European Union, for instance, imposes the “polluter pays principle” with relative stringency in some contexts, and there are efforts in Canada and Australia to revise their environmental laws to expedite cleanups. However, these efforts still contend with the same dynamic that emerges in the ECC Site story: large companies wielding significant influence, armed with legal and financial strategies that can hamper or slow robust remediation.

Meanwhile, the global financial system often rewards quarterly or annual returns over long-term stewardship. Under neoliberal capitalism, deregulation and privatization have been championed as ways to foster market efficiency and economic growth. But as the ECC Site and countless other hazardous locations show, unbridled free markets can spawn, or at least fail to deter, environmental disasters if not tightly regulated. And when disasters do occur, the cleanup timeline—spanning decades—contrasts sharply with the immediate profits reaped by polluters.

In the past decade, there has been a resurgence of activism calling for more stringent measures, such as criminal penalties for executives who oversee environmental abuses. Some advocates also promote the idea of public ownership or co-management of critical resources to prevent corporations from externalizing environmental costs. Yet these reforms face an uphill battle. The ECC Site’s drawn-out amendments, with repeated references to negotiations and partial approvals, illustrate how resistant a well-established corporate polluter can be to definitive solutions—no matter how many times the government intervenes.

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[11] Pathways for Reform and Consumer Advocacy

Looking forward, the ECC Site remains a poignant case study in the flaws of the current system—and a call to action for those hoping to reform it. The new 2024 amendments add layers of Additional Work: extraction wells, expansions to the containment cap, improved treatment systems, and the promise of a revised Remedial Alternatives Analysis Report. These updates suggest that the story is not yet over; indeed, they may herald another decade or more of partial steps, negotiations, and court supervision.

But the narrative does not have to be one of perpetual frustration. Below are potential pathways to foster genuine reform:

1. Strengthen Enforcement Mechanisms
   CERCLA grants significant authority to the EPA and state agencies, but these bodies can only work effectively if they have sufficient funding, staffing, and political support. Legislative bodies could bolster these agencies’ budgets and explicitly empower them to impose swifter, harsher penalties when corporate defendants fail to meet deadlines—making it more costly to delay or “do the bare minimum.”
2. Close Regulatory Loopholes
   The repetitive nature of modifications to the Consent Decree highlights certain gaps in the regulatory process. By establishing stricter timelines and imposing mandatory injunctive relief, the legal system could reduce the scope for infinite negotiations. For instance, once a site’s contamination surpasses a set threshold, the corporations might be compelled to finance a well-defined, non-negotiable cleanup plan with clear metrics for success.
3. Implement Real-time Public Disclosure
   A standard approach to building community trust is frequent and transparent reporting. Instead of monthly progress reports that go mostly to regulatory agencies, an online platform could publish data in real-time—showing contamination levels, cleanup progress, and compliance metrics. Such transparency can mobilize local communities and the broader public to hold corporations accountable.
4. Expand Criminal Liability for Egregious Violations
   In most environmental cases, corporations face only civil penalties. Yet some argue that holding executives criminally liable for flagrant or repeated endangerment would dramatically shift incentives. If corporate leaders risked personal fines or jail time, the calculus would tilt more towards thorough cleanup and away from indefinite legal wrangling.
5. Empower Consumer and Worker Advocacy
   The public often underestimates its own power as consumers and workers. Large corporations, particularly those in consumer-facing industries, can be influenced by public opinion, boycotts, and union pressure. Advocacy groups that highlight how a company’s brand is linked to environmental neglect can help shift corporate behavior. For instance, alliances between local communities and nationwide advocacy networks might amplify the ECC Site’s story, spurring action at corporate headquarters fearful of reputational damage.
6. Promote Local Economic Redevelopment
   The stigma of living near a contaminated site can depress entire regional economies. Government programs and corporate settlement funds could be directed more explicitly toward revitalizing the local area. This might include cleaning up the site to standards that allow for recreation or residential use, thereby restoring real estate values and removing the public health threat. In some successful Superfund cleanups, the result has been a transformation from a toxic dump to a public park or commercial development.
7. Reframe Environmental Protection as a Public Good
   Ultimately, part of the solution lies in shifting societal values. In an economic paradigm that measures success primarily by corporate profits, environmental cleanups can be framed as a burden or cost. A shift toward seeing clean air and water as fundamental human rights—and contamination as a direct threat to them—helps reorient policy and corporate strategy. This moral framing can energize activism, shape legislation, and ensure that polluters are not allowed to externalize harm onto communities.

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So the Department of Justice has a page for this: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decree/us-et-al-v-environmental-conservation-and-chemical-corporation-et-al

idk how long it’ll stay for, but the DOJ also got: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/media/1385236/dl?inline