1. Introduction

On December 25, 2021, a malfunction at the Cardinal Power Plant’s pollution control system triggered a chain of events that, over the following 30 boiler-operating days, resulted in repeated violations of mercury emissions limits—thirty separate exceedances, to be exact. According to a recent Consent Agreement and Final Order filed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), these exceedances were in direct violation of the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, which sets strict mercury limits for coal-fired power units.

The penalty eventually paid by Cardinal Operating Company and Buckeye Power, Inc. was a mere pittance of $112,621.

Why Mercury Matters

Mercury is a neurotoxin. Excess levels of mercury in the air eventually deposit into water bodies, contaminating fish and affecting wildlife and human health, particularly in communities that rely on local fishing. Children are especially vulnerable to neurological harm. The violations, as reported by the facility itself, highlight a major risk: when pollution controls fail, even briefly, innocent people who live near or downwind from a coal-fired plant can be exposed to heightened dangers.

The Heart of the Allegation

Cardinal’s Unit 3 coal-fired boiler violated the 30-boiler-operating-day rolling average for mercury emissions, set at 1.2 pounds per trillion British thermal units.

Between December 26, 2021, and January 24, 2022, that limit was exceeded thirty times. In total, the “upset/malfunction of the JBR chemistry” at the plant caused a series of repeated episodes in which the mercury pollution soared above permissible levels. Despite self-reporting the incidents and subsequently fixing the issues, the company faced enforcement action for failing to remain within safe mercury thresholds.

Beyond the Individual Case

This story encapsulates recurring themes of corporate ethics, corporate accountability, and the dangers of allowing profit motives to overshadow public well-being.

While Cardinal Operating Company eventually came to a settlement, the entire situation forces us to question the extent to which regulatory fines—even those in the six-figure range—serve as genuine deterrents. Does a penalty of slightly over one hundred thousand dollars meaningfully change behavior in an industry where daily revenues can dwarf that figure? More troublingly, do such episodes merely confirm the existence of a “compliance calculus” under neoliberal capitalism, wherein some corporations find it cheaper to pay fines than to fully ensure the public’s protection?

This article will examine not only the CAFO’s allegations but also the broader cultural and economic environment—marked by deregulation, possible regulatory capture, and corporate greed—that can lead to such events. Ultimately, the settlement between Cardinal Power Plant and the EPA highlights a fundamental question about corporations’ dangers to public health: is this a rare slip, or just the latest manifestation of a pattern in which pollution is the byproduct of prioritizing profits over people?


2. Corporate Intent Exposed

In legal documents, it is often challenging to pin down “corporate intent.” The Consent Agreement and Final Order itself does not allege that the plant’s operators intentionally emitted mercury at illegal levels; it does not contain “smoking gun” evidence of executives plotting to dodge regulations. Indeed, the CAFO explicitly states that the Respondents “neither admit nor deny” the allegations, as is common in many settlements. Nevertheless, the repeated exceedances, each of which violated the Clean Air Act, underscore a set of priorities or at least complacencies within the corporation.

Balancing Act or Profit Motive?

In a broader sense, under neoliberal capitalism, corporations are incentivized first and foremost to maximize shareholder returns. While corporate social responsibility has become a popular buzzword, the impetus to drive profits can overshadow thorough compliance with environmental laws. Because of the high costs associated with emission control technology, especially for pollutants like mercury, it is often the case that power plants face a significant capital outlay to keep pollution at or below regulatory thresholds. When something breaks—such as a malfunction in the JBR (Jet Bubbling Reactor) chemistry at Cardinal—rectifying it immediately may run up costs, leading to potential short-term incentives to delay or minimize repairs.

The complaint, however, does not accuse Cardinal of a prolonged conspiracy to sidestep mercury regulations. Instead, it focuses on that short but impactful period of “upset/malfunction of the JBR chemistry” that allegedly led to 30 separate exceedances. Yet the fact that the problem lingered long enough to cause repeated violations raises questions. How robust were the plant’s contingency plans? How quickly did management respond once the mercury levels began inching above safe limits? And more pointedly: was the company’s internal mechanism for risk management shaped by a cost-benefit analysis that downplayed the dangers to public health?

What the Complaint Tells Us—and What It Doesn’t

  • Specific Violation Counts: The CAFO references exactly 30 exceedances of the mercury limit over a 30-day span. This indicates that every single day in that timeframe saw a breach of compliance (or a repeated carryover from previous operational cycles).
  • Reasoning Cited by the Company: The facility suggests that an upset in the JBR system beginning on December 25, 2021, caused the meltdown in compliance. Cardinal self-reported these issues to the Ohio EPA, attributing the problem to a malfunction or “upset condition.”
  • Potential Corporate Blind Spots: The complaint does not deeply probe corporate culture or decision-making. But it does highlight a scenario in which an essential pollution control system was compromised. The bigger corporate intent question arises in how the top management allowed these circumstances to continue for an entire 30-boiler-operating-day window.

In the broader context of the energy industry, unexpected malfunctions are not uncommon. Yet critics often note that repeated, multi-day violations suggest either insufficient preventive maintenance or a slow response time. When mercury emissions soared, were there immediate actions to reduce production or switch fuel blends? Or did the plant continue operations at normal capacity, effectively gambling with environmental compliance?

Corporate Culture Under Neoliberal Pressures

Neoliberal capitalism often predisposes companies to see regulations not as absolute moral obligations but as negotiable constraints. When environmental compliance is just another line item in a budget, outrunning regulators can become part of the business model. Even though Cardinal ultimately faced a financial penalty for these alleged violations, the question is whether the amount is a mere slap on the wrist in the grand scheme of their total profits.

This section—“Corporate Intent Exposed”—is not about an overt conspiracy detailed in the complaint; it’s about the underlying impetus of a system that weighs the cost of potential fines against the expenses of strict compliance. By paying $112,621, the company neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing, effectively closing the matter. But for residents, workers, and environmental advocates, the real question is whether the penalty truly encapsulates the level of harm that might have been inflicted on public health and local ecosystems in the Ohio Valley.


3. The Corporate Playbook / How They Got Away With It

“How did the plant manage to operate outside legal mercury limits for thirty boiler-operating days?” That is the key question that frames this section. The Consent Agreement and Final Order does not provide a blow-by-blow explanation, but we can glean insight from common industry tactics, historical precedents, and the limited statements within the complaint.

Tactic 1: Self-Reporting as Damage Control

One notable aspect of this case is that Cardinal Operating Company reported its own exceedances. Under many Title V permits, regulated facilities must submit Deviation Reports when they violate emission limits. Cardinal complied with these requirements, thus disclosing the mercury exceedances to the Ohio EPA in late 2021 and early 2022. A cynic might argue that “self-reporting” is less about corporate ethics and more about controlling the narrative and mitigating potential legal ramifications. By stepping forward, the company likely sought to show good faith and reduce the severity of potential fines.

Tactic 2: Blame the Equipment Malfunction

The complaint reveals that Cardinal’s official explanation for the exceedances was an “upset/malfunction of the JBR chemistry.” In an industrial context, the JBR system is part of flue-gas desulfurization technology, designed to remove or reduce pollutants, including mercury. Equipment malfunctions happen, but effective corporate compliance programs typically have backups and contingencies to avoid prolonged periods of illegal pollution.

The broader “corporate playbook” often involves attributing violations to mechanical or software failure. While plausible, this narrative sidesteps deeper questions: Was the JBR system adequately maintained? Were there known vulnerabilities that went unaddressed? The complaint does not specify the underlying root cause beyond “potential fixes,” but these missing details raise the possibility that negligence or cost-saving decisions could have contributed to the extended malfunction.

Tactic 3: “We’re Fixing It”—A Classic Move

Companies commonly reassure regulators and the public that solutions are in the works. “We identified potential fixes” is precisely the type of statement that appears in the complaint: “Cardinal later identified potential fixes.” That signals that the plant did eventually address the malfunction. However, it does not change the fact that the facility went over the legal mercury threshold for 30 consecutive boiler-operating days.

Publicly, such a statement may serve to quell outrage or ward off additional scrutiny. Yet from the vantage point of corporate accountability, the question remains: should these “fixes” have been more readily available, and if so, why weren’t they implemented sooner?

Tactic 4: Relying on Regulatory Complexity

Under neoliberal capitalism, regulatory frameworks are often so complex that enforcement can be slow or inconsistent. The Clean Air Act and its implementing regulations (like NESHAP Subpart UUUUU) are formidable, but agencies such as the EPA have limited resources. When a violation occurs, the wheels of federal enforcement can turn slowly. From an industry perspective, this lag time between violations and enforcement can open opportunities to continue operating while legal processes play out.

In many cases, potential violators “get away with it” for extended periods because the government must gather evidence, issue Notice of Violations, and engage in negotiations. Here, the Notice and Finding of Violation (NOV/FOV) was issued on February 9, 2024—over two years after the initial malfunction. During that interim, the company could theoretically continue its normal operations. By the time the penalty was decided, the original impetus for the violation might have faded from public memory.

Tactic 5: Settling Without Admission of Liability

Finally, the settlement that arises from these enforcement actions often involves a payment without an admission of wrongdoing. This model is particularly common across many industries. Settling “without admitting or denying” is a tool that companies use to avoid the prolonged negative press of a full-blown trial. The case is quickly resolved, the liability is contained, and the corporation moves on.

While settlement can be an efficient legal mechanism, it often leaves the public with no official confirmation of what truly happened, beyond the mere fact of a violation. Moreover, the penalty of $112,621 for a modern coal-fired power plant can be seen as a cost of doing business. Indeed, critics argue this approach normalizes corporate pollution under the premise that any wrongdoing can be resolved with a check.

The Broader Playbook in Perspective

In the broader context, we see a consistent pattern:

  1. Attribute the violation to mechanical failure or externalities.
  2. Self-report (as required by law) to control the narrative.
  3. Demonstrate that you are “addressing the problem” as soon as enforcement looms.
  4. Negotiate a settlement that ends the matter with no formal admission of guilt, paying a fine often dwarfed by corporate revenues.

Ultimately, the “corporate playbook” often successfully evades deeper accountability or sweeping operational changes.


4. Crime Pays / The Corporate Profit Equation

When the Fine Is Cheaper Than the Fix

One question inevitably arises: If a malfunction repeated for 30 days, was it cheaper to continue emitting mercury above legal limits than to halt production or perform immediate, expensive repairs? This is at the core of the “Crime Pays” argument, suggesting that under neoliberal capitalism, if the profit from continued operations outweighs the potential fines, corporations might find it profitable to delay compliance.

In this particular case, the final penalty was $112,621. This may be significant to smaller businesses, but in the context of a coal-fired power plant generating megawatts for thousands or even millions of users, that sum can be a rounding error. Modern power plants often rake in millions of dollars in electricity sales daily—though the exact revenue figures for Cardinal are not stated in the CAFO. The key point is that, from an economic perspective, even a six-figure fine might be inconsequential if weighed against the potential financial losses from shutting down a unit or investing in immediate large-scale repairs.

Calculated Risk

History has shown that many corporate entities undertake “compliance cost-benefit analyses.” They factor in the likelihood of a violation being discovered, the probability and size of any resulting penalty, and the operational gains from continuing business as usual. If the expected fine is less than the cost of an overhaul or immediate fix, the company may risk a violation. Over time, the cost savings from delayed maintenance or incomplete compliance can significantly boost quarterly earnings, which in turn buoy share prices and satisfy shareholder expectations.

While this article cannot assert that Cardinal Operating Company or Buckeye Power explicitly used such a calculation, the repeated exceedances do point to a possible willingness to endure some level of regulatory risk. The bigger question is whether our regulatory framework inadvertently encourages such behavior by failing to make penalties truly prohibitive.

The Broader Ramifications: Wealth Disparity and Social Harm

When a coal plant emits toxic levels of mercury, it is often the local communities—frequently lower-income areas near industrial sites—that bear the brunt of exposure. People living downwind or downstream from these facilities may experience higher risks of mercury poisoning, which can harm fetal development and cognitive function in children. Meanwhile, wealthier neighborhoods far from the plant or corporate headquarters remain insulated from these direct hazards.

This disparity highlights a broader theme of corporate ethics under neoliberal capitalism: the externalization of costs. In essence, pollution’s real costs—healthcare bills, environmental degradation, lost workdays due to illness—are borne by communities and not fully accounted for on corporate balance sheets. “Crime Pays” because the profits remain private while the broader societal costs are pushed onto individuals, local governments, and the healthcare system.

Compliance as a Line Item

The complaint references Title V Permit requirements and NESHAP Subpart UUUUU standards that the plant was obliged to meet. Maintaining compliance typically requires investing in advanced pollution-control technology, ongoing monitoring, and staff training. These are not negligible expenses. If a piece of essential equipment like the JBR flue gas cleaning system malfunctions, the plant must either repair it rapidly (at considerable cost) or risk violating emission limits.

From the vantage point of corporate profit, if the entire fiasco ends in a relatively small penalty, the impetus to spend heavily on robust systems or frequent inspections may be diminished. This is the essence of the “Crime Pays” argument: even if the company is eventually caught, the financial repercussions often pale compared to the money saved by cutting corners.

Societal Expectations vs. Corporate Reality

The Clean Air Act, along with state-level Title V permits, was designed to ensure public safety by limiting hazardous emissions. In theory, any corporation that repeatedly violates these standards should face swift and substantial penalties. Yet in practice, the scale of fines, the length of enforcement processes, and the complexities of legal negotiations can produce outcomes that seem disproportionate to the damage done.

Indeed, the cycle of short-term compliance breakdowns, mild fines, and no admission of wrongdoing has led many activists and environmental organizations to demand a shift in how we penalize polluters. They argue for penalties that scale with a company’s revenues or the extent of harm caused. Otherwise, the cardinal rule of neoliberal capitalism—profit maximization—ensures that a small penalty is simply the cost of doing business, enabling corporations to recoup those fines quickly while local communities face far longer-term consequences.

In sum, the settlement in the Cardinal case, though it concluded the legal matter, raises deep concerns about whether the financial penalty truly offset the corporate gains from continued operation during the malfunction. If the money saved by delaying repairs surpassed $112,621, then from a purely economic standpoint, ignoring mercury limits may have paid off. That is the disconcerting logic of a system where “Crime Pays.”


5. System Failure / Why Regulators Did Nothing

One might wonder: With 30 distinct exceedances of mercury emissions over a full month of operation, why were regulators not more proactive? Did the Environmental Protection Agency or Ohio EPA stand idly by while toxic emissions continued day after day? Though the final Consent Agreement and Final Order clarifies that the agency did eventually respond, the time gap between the violations (December 2021–January 2022) and the formal Notice and Finding of Violation (February 2024) is striking.

Sluggish Enforcement Machinery

Regulatory agencies often operate under resource constraints. The Clean Air Act is enforced by the EPA in conjunction with state agencies like the Ohio EPA, but these bodies must handle thousands of facilities with limited manpower. Monitoring real-time compliance can be daunting, especially for technical issues like mercury emissions that require specialized equipment to measure. In addition, self-reported data from operators—like Cardinal’s own deviation reports—must be reviewed, verified, and contextualized before any enforcement action is taken.

Regulatory Capture or Deregulation?

Critics might point to the broader phenomenon of “regulatory capture,” a situation in which the agencies responsible for enforcing rules are unduly influenced by the very industries they regulate. While the Cardinal complaint does not offer explicit evidence of regulatory capture, the slow pace and relatively small penalty can be viewed as symptomatic of a system that prioritizes corporate-friendly policies, consistent with neoliberal capitalism’s push toward deregulation. In many industries, lobbying efforts have weakened environmental laws, lowered enforcement budgets, and generally shaped a playing field that favors corporations.

The Title V Permitting Process

Under Title V of the Clean Air Act, major sources of air pollution (like large power plants) must obtain a permit outlining specific emission limits and monitoring requirements. This approach is intended to provide clarity and accountability. In practice, though, a Title V permit’s efficacy depends on rigorous oversight. If a facility’s monitoring data show exceedances, the next steps—inspections, notices of violation, fines, or mandated corrective actions—are subject to the agency’s discretion and timelines.

In this case:

  • Cardinal was bound by Title V Permit No. P0089700, which incorporated the same mercury emission limit of 1.2 lbs/TBtu.
  • The facility reported that from December 26, 2021 to January 24, 2022, it exceeded that limit 30 times.
  • The regulator was notified through mandated Deviation Reports, but immediate enforcement was not forthcoming.

By the time the EPA escalated the matter with a Notice and Finding of Violation in February 2024, two years had elapsed. While it’s possible behind-the-scenes discussions were ongoing, the timeline underscores the glacial speed of environmental enforcement. For local communities near Brilliant, Ohio, the sense of an immediate regulatory response was likely lacking.

Systemic Weaknesses Exposed

When regulators levy a fine of just over $100,000, it can project the message that repeated pollution episodes are not treated with utmost severity. That perceived leniency reflects systemic weaknesses in environmental oversight:

  1. Budgetary Constraints: The EPA’s enforcement division often lacks the staff and funding to track down every violation swiftly.
  2. Political Pressures: Under administrations that favor deregulation, enforcement priorities might shift away from aggressive pollution crackdowns.
  3. Industry Complexity: Coal plants operate massive, multifaceted systems. A thorough investigation into mechanical malfunctions can require specialized expertise that slows enforcement.
  4. Negotiated Settlements: The CAFO settlement model privileges expedient resolution over exhaustive litigation, sometimes leading to smaller fines and no formal admission of fault.

When Regulators “Do Nothing,” Everyone Else Pays

Of course, it is an overstatement to claim the EPA literally “did nothing.” The final CAFO shows that the agency did investigate, reach an agreement, and impose a penalty. Yet from a local resident’s perspective, the question remains: Why did it take so long and cost so little? Mercury, after all, is no trifling pollutant—it is a potent neurotoxin with potentially irreversible public-health impacts.

If the system took two years to resolve a major series of violations and concluded with a moderate fine, how confident can communities be that future infractions will be caught quickly, deterred effectively, and penalized appropriately? This potential breakdown in accountability feeds the narrative that regulatory frameworks under neoliberal capitalism are structurally designed to protect corporate profitability rather than the public interest.

In the final analysis, the “system failure” portion of this story is less about any specific oversight lapses by a single government official and more about a deeply entrenched dynamic. When large corporations repeatedly pollute and still face only modest penalties after prolonged delays, a rational observer might conclude that the enforcement regime, as currently structured, is insufficient. That repeated deficiency fosters cynicism, as communities see the cycle of violation, tardy regulatory response, and minimal penalty repeat itself—one power plant at a time.


6. This Pattern of Predation Is a Feature, Not a Bug

While “predation” may sound like a harsh term for a mercury emission violation, the real-world consequences of corporate pollution can be devastating for human health, local economies, and ecosystems. Beyond the immediate facts of the Cardinal Power Plant’s alleged emissions exceedances, this case exemplifies a broader phenomenon in corporate America: the systematic shift of costs and risks onto communities and the environment, while profits remain privatized.

Neoliberal Capitalism and Structural Incentives

Neoliberal capitalism, the prevailing economic paradigm, exalts free-market mechanisms, deregulation, and private enterprise. One consequence of this ideology is that corporations are pressured above all to maximize shareholder value. Environmental protections, worker safety, and community well-being—though rhetorically acknowledged—often become secondary considerations. In sectors such as energy, resource extraction, and chemical manufacturing, externalizing pollution costs can significantly boost profitability.

In the context of the Cardinal case:

  • A malfunction in pollution control led to repeated mercury exceedances.
  • The direct victims of this fiasco are the local residents who may have been exposed to higher pollution levels, and the environment that absorbed increased mercury deposits.
  • The company eventually paid a fine but avoided more severe sanctions, enabling it to resume normal operations with minimal disruption.

For critics of neoliberal capitalism, these episodes are not accidental “bugs” in the system; they are structural “features.” The deregulated environment, combined with the slow and often tepid enforcement actions, ensures that companies have little reason to adopt genuinely transformative measures unless forced by public outcry or catastrophic events.

Historical Parallels

Many industries have faced controversies eerily similar to the Cardinal complaint. From automotive manufacturers evading emissions standards to chemical plants dumping toxic waste, the pattern reveals a consistent strategy: push the limits of permissible pollution; if caught, settle swiftly; keep the admission of wrongdoing out of official records; pay a fine that barely affects long-term profits.

In some high-profile cases, the public learned of hidden memos or internal emails that laid bare corporate strategies to subvert regulations. No such “smoking gun” is mentioned in the Cardinal complaint. Yet the underlying dynamic is comparable—corporate entities weighed the risk, operated out of compliance, and were eventually penalized.

The Human Face of Predation

When we talk about “predation,” we must remember the real people living near these facilities. Some might rely on local rivers for fishing, which can be contaminated by mercury. Others might work in or around the plant, breathing in its emissions daily. Over time, the cumulative impact of these exposures can exacerbate public health issues, from neurological disorders to developmental problems in children.

The sense of being “preyed upon” arises when communities realize that corporate polluters calculate fines into their operations and rarely undergo thorough reforms. Meanwhile, residents are left to bear intangible costs: lost quality of life, medical bills, fear for their children’s well-being, and the day-to-day stress that stems from living in a heavily industrialized zone.

Consolidation of Corporate Power

Another feature of neoliberal capitalism is the consolidation of power in fewer and fewer hands. Large companies that own multiple facilities can spread risks and resources across a wide portfolio. Even if one plant faces a penalty, the broader enterprise remains profitable. At times, corporate power can dwarf that of local governments or citizen groups. Legal battles become drawn-out wars of attrition, where well-funded legal teams stand against community advocates who can scarcely afford extended litigation.

“Accidents” or Inevitable Outcomes?

For decades, corporations have depicted pollution episodes as “one-off accidents,” “isolated malfunctions,” or “bad apples.” Yet the frequency of such events across industries suggests that pollution is not merely an accident—it is often the result of normal business operations under the existing system. The repeated mercury exceedances at Cardinal might indeed have been triggered by a mechanical malfunction. But the extended duration and repeated nature of the violation underscore that the system is designed to weather these “accidents” without forcing comprehensive changes.

In short, it is not enough to view the Cardinal settlement in a vacuum. This pattern is ubiquitous: from big oil’s repeated spills to the opioid crisis created by pharmaceutical companies. Each instance reveals a system where corporate accountability is weak, fines are small relative to profits, and public interests are secondary. Therefore, the predatory element is not an anomaly; it is woven into the fabric of how many large corporations navigate environmental regulations.


7. The PR Playbook of Damage Control

After the dust settles on an alleged violation, how do corporations manage public perception? Although the CAFO does not detail any specific public-relations strategies employed by Cardinal or Buckeye Power, we can glean insights from typical industry responses when confronted with environmental or public-health violations.

Step 1: Contain the Story

The first move is often to keep the story from blowing up. Because the Cardinal case did not generate widespread national headlines, the company likely faced minimal public scrutiny beyond local coverage. The settlement with the EPA was overshadowed by other news stories, enabling the facility to manage the narrative quietly. A low-profile approach might involve standard press releases or no formal statements at all, ensuring that only those closely following EPA enforcement actions are aware of the details.

Step 2: Emphasize “Compliance” and “Cooperation”

Most corporate statements in these scenarios strike a conciliatory tone:

  • “We take environmental compliance seriously.”
  • “We cooperated fully with the EPA’s inquiry.”
  • “We swiftly identified corrective measures to ensure this does not happen again.”

These statements offer reassurance while sidestepping responsibility for the past harm. By using phrases like “taking environmental protection seriously,” the company shifts focus toward its purported good intentions.

Step 3: Highlight Investments in Technology

When a facility invests in any new equipment to reduce emissions—whether required by the settlement or planned beforehand—it is not uncommon to see press releases boasting of the company’s commitment to clean energy or advanced pollution controls. These announcements help shape a narrative that the corporation is on the cutting edge of corporate social responsibility, even if the impetus for these investments was a legal violation.

Step 4: Community Outreach or Charity

Some corporations also embark on outreach or philanthropic initiatives in the aftermath of a violation. While there is no direct evidence from the CAFO that Cardinal engaged in such efforts, many companies in parallel situations donate to local nonprofits, sponsor community events, or launch “corporate social responsibility” programs. The aim is to rebuild goodwill and present the corporation as a pillar of the local community, rather than an entity that violated environmental standards.

Step 5: Keep It Vague

Crucially, the PR playbook often relies on vague language. The public might never learn the specific mechanics of how a JBR system malfunctioned or the exact timeline of the fixes. The company may suggest that the violations were mostly technical in nature, overshadowing the real health or ecological risks posed by mercury. In so doing, the corporation frames the event as a minor hiccup rather than a systemic lapse in corporate ethics or a reflection of corporate greed.

Step 6: Ride Out the News Cycle

Under neoliberal capitalism’s breakneck news pace, stories can fade quickly. Once an EPA settlement is signed, the company typically has no impetus to sustain a public conversation. By releasing carefully timed statements and cooperating with local media in a controlled way, the corporation can ensure that any coverage is short-lived. Without intense public uproar or a major investigative spotlight, the story doesn’t gain the critical mass needed to incite widespread calls for deeper reforms.

Consequence for Public Awareness

When a PR strategy successfully downplays an environmental violation, the broader community remains underinformed. Residents may not realize the extent of the exceedances or the toxic nature of mercury. This lack of awareness often translates into a weak political response—fewer calls to local officials, minimal activism at town halls, and no large-scale demands for better oversight.

Ultimately, the PR playbook ensures that a corporation can survive or even thrive after a pollution incident with minimal blowback. While it’s impossible to confirm each of these damage-control tactics in the Cardinal case, the overarching pattern is all too familiar. Without a dedicated effort to bring these issues to public attention, the narrative recedes, overshadowed by corporate messaging that highlights “compliance” and “commitment to safety” while eliding the deeper structural drivers of these violations.


8. Corporate Power vs. Public Interest

At the heart of the Cardinal case—like so many corporate pollution incidents—is the tension between corporate power and the public interest. The cardinal question remains: can a system guided by the profit motive deliver genuine corporate accountability and safeguard communities from corporate pollution? Or is the occasional monetary penalty a mere fig leaf, insufficient to deter future misconduct?

The Lessons of the Cardinal Settlement

  1. Limited Deterrence: A fine of $112,621 is unlikely to force a major recalibration of corporate priorities if the plant’s overall profitability remains untouched.
  2. Slow Enforcement: Two years passed between the mercury exceedances and the Notice of Violation. Such a delay suggests that the regulatory system struggles to respond in real-time, allowing potential harm to continue unchecked.
  3. Administrative Closure: By agreeing to the Consent Agreement and Final Order, the company avoided protracted litigation or public trial. There is minimal opportunity for community members to challenge or question the resolution once the settlement is finalized.

The Broader Socioeconomic Impact

  • Economic Fallout: While the plant’s potential short-term cost savings might help maintain stable electricity rates or investor returns, local communities also pay via potential health impacts and diminished quality of life. Over time, such costs can escalate, fueling more profound wealth disparity between corporate stakeholders and ordinary citizens.
  • Corporate Pollution & Public Health: Mercury’s effects on neurological development, especially in children, underline the dangers to public health from corporate malfeasance. These dangers do not vanish with the signing of a settlement. Toxins linger in environments long after the violations have occurred.
  • Corporate Social Responsibility or Greenwashing?: Even if the company invests in new pollution controls or claims to champion a “green strategy,” these moves could be overshadowed by the fact that a violation occurred and was effectively resolved with a check. Critics argue this dynamic encourages “greenwashing,” where a company’s stated commitment to environmental protection masks deeper operational lapses.

A Call for Stronger Accountability

Environmental advocates and consumer-advocacy groups argue that the system must implement stricter penalties that genuinely reflect the harm caused, pegged perhaps to the facility’s revenue or the degree of environmental damage. Without these stronger mechanisms, repeated corporate abuses under the banner of neoliberal capitalism may continue unchecked, exacerbating wealth disparity and undermining social justice.

If regulators do not swiftly hold corporate offenders to account, the result is a societal message that polluting the air, water, or soil is an acceptable risk. This acceptance fosters cynicism and hopelessness among impacted communities, who watch large corporations commit infractions with minimal repercussions while ordinary citizens face the direct consequences of toxic exposure.

Skepticism About Corporate Change

Publicly traded corporations, energy cooperatives, and private power producers alike face the same structural incentives: boosting efficiency, cutting operational expenses, and elevating shareholder or member returns. While some companies do indeed strive to balance environmental stewardship with business goals, the systemic impetus in a free-market economy often undermines meaningful, across-the-board reforms. Put simply, it remains cheaper in many cases to pollute than to implement robust safeguards, especially if the penalty for getting caught is modest.

Hope in Public Outcry and Legislative Action

It is crucial to note that significant change can occur when public outrage rises to the surface. Large-scale environmental disasters—such as widespread contamination events—sometimes spur new legislation or shifts in enforcement priorities. Grassroots movements, civil lawsuits, and investigative reporting can likewise force corporations to internalize pollution costs. But for these changes to happen, the public must be informed and engaged, pushing elected officials to bolster environmental protections and demanding that agencies like the EPA receive the resources they need to act swiftly.

In the final analysis, the alleged misconduct at Cardinal Power Plant, though resolved through a $112,621 penalty, speaks volumes about a broader system in which corporate influence can overshadow the public interest. This is not an isolated incident—it is the product of an economic framework that leaves critical decisions in the hands of profit-seeking entities. Until structural reforms elevate the priority of community well-being and ecological integrity, we risk experiencing a repeating pattern of short-lived regulatory crackdowns followed by corporate recidivism.


Conclusion

Over the course of these eight sections, we have seen how the alleged Clean Air Act violations at the Cardinal Power Plant reflect a larger tension between corporate profitability and environmental protection. Despite promptly self-reporting and eventually reaching a settlement, the company’s repeated mercury exceedances highlight the fragility of regulatory oversight and the precarious position of communities located near industrial operations.

Moving forward, what can be done?

  1. Strengthen Enforcement: Increase funding and support for regulatory bodies so they can detect and penalize violations in real-time, not years after the fact.
  2. Escalate Penalties: Tie fines to company revenues or the severity of harm, ensuring that illegal pollution is never an economically viable strategy.
  3. Enhance Transparency: Mandate clearer, more accessible public reporting of emissions data so that community members can hold local facilities accountable.
  4. Political Engagement: Encourage local and national advocacy, ensuring that public officials understand the stakes for those living near power plants and other industrial sites.

Ultimately, whether the system can meaningfully transform depends on the collective willingness of citizens, regulators, and even conscientious business leaders to reject a model where “crime pays.” If we treat the Cardinal settlement as a cautionary tale rather than an isolated incident, we can channel it into momentum for reforms that genuinely prioritize public health, social justice, and environmental sustainability.


We upload 4 new articles on corporate misconduct every single day! To read them as they come out, visit:
Evil Corporations neglecting safety protocols to cut costs, risking consumer harm for higher profits: https://evilcorporations.org/category/product-safety-violations/
Evil Corporations deliberately contaminating ecosystems to avoid expenses, prioritizing greed over sustainability: https://evilcorporations.org/category/environmental-violations/
Evil Corporations exploiting workers through unsafe conditions and unfair wages to maximize corporate gains: https://evilcorporations.org/category/labor-exploitation/
Evil Corporations recklessly mishandling or exploiting personal data, prioritizing profit over user security and consent, often exposing individuals to harm or manipulation: https://evilcorporations.org/category/data-breach-privacy/
Evil Corporations manipulating records to mislead stakeholders, enabling illicit wealth accumulation and systemic corruption: https://evilcorporations.org/category/financial-fraud/
Evil Corporations deceiving consumers with false claims to manipulate demand and conceal product risks: https://evilcorporations.org/category/misleading-marketing/
Evil Corporations doing corporate misconduct that doesn’t neatly fit into the earlier mentioned categories: https://evilcorporations.org/category/misc/